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GOVERNMENT ETHICS IN THE AGE OF TRUMP
Adam Raviv*
ABSTRACT
Americans’ trust in government officials has never been lower. Despite the 
intense public focus on ethics in government in recent years, legal scholarship on 
the subject has been sparse. This Article fills the gap by examining the ethics 
regime of the federal executive branch in depth, with a discussion of both the 
applicable ethics standards and the agencies and offices that are charged with 
ensuring that government officials comply with those standards. The Article 
describes how the current system heavily emphasizes prevention, education, and 
highly detailed disclosures while it rarely enforces the law against wrongdoers. A
federal official in the United States is literally more likely to be struck by lightning 
than to be charged with violating a government ethics law. The Article then 
considers the federal government’s ethics regime through the lens of criminal 
deterrence theory and concludes that the current system is an example of what not 
to do if the goal is to discourage violations. To address this deficiency, the Article 
proposes a number of reforms to the current system to improve the deterrent effect of 
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INTRODUCTION
American trust in government has hit a low point. In 2019, just 
seventeen percent of Americans agreed that they could trust the 
government in Washington to do what is right most or all of the 
time.1 This was not the result of a sudden, recent shift, as trust in 
the federal government has steadily eroded ever since a peak after 
9/11.2
In particular, a 2014 Gallup poll found that seventy-five percent 
of Americans agreed that “corruption [is] widespread throughout 
the government in this country.”3 President Trump, of course, was 
1. Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 11, 2019), https:
//www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-2019 [https:
//perma.cc/2DS3-Q2YT]; see also Lee Raine, Scot Keeter & Andrew Perrin, Trust and Distrust 
in America, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 22, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22
/trust-and-distrust-in-america [https://perma.cc/5RTK-67BG].
2. See Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, supra note 1.
3. 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, GALLUP (Sept. 19, 2015), https://
news.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-government-corruption.aspx [https://perma.cc
/45WL-5YEF].
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elected in 2016 on promises to “drain the swamp” of corruption in 
Washington.4 But a 2017 survey by Transparency International, the 
international anticorruption organization, concluded that “rather 
than feeling better about progress in the fight against corruption 
over the past year, a clear majority of people in America now say 
that things have become worse.”5 The following year, the United 
States dropped in Transparency International’s international cor-
ruption rankings, as it was designated a “country to watch and 
monitor” due to the finding that “[t]he country is currently wit-
nessing threats to its system of checks and balances, as well as an 
erosion of ethical norms at the highest levels of power.”6
For all the concern about corruption and unethical behavior in 
American government, it is not for lack of a set of express stand-
ards that officials are required to follow. On the contrary, an ex-
tensive mosaic of laws and rules governs the behavior of federal 
employees. Nor, for that matter, is it for lack of substantial gov-
ernment resources devoted to ensuring officials comply with those 
standards. A vast array of agency ethics offices, inspectors general, 
and other officials throughout the government supposedly police 
misbehavior as well as provide guidance and training on proper 
compliance with the rules.
Part of the reason for this disconnect may be another discon-
nect: that between the extensive system of federal ethics standards 
and offices and the extremely rare acts of enforcement against sus-
pected violators. Despite the numerous laws and regulations, it is 
very uncommon for a federal official to be disciplined in any way 
for violating them, and the total number of such disciplinary ac-
tions has dropped steadily in recent years. And criminal prosecu-
tions are orders of magnitude rarer, taking place only in the most 
exceptional of cases. A federal official in the United States is literal-
ly more likely to be struck by lightning than to be charged with vio-
lating government ethics laws.7
4. See, e.g., Ryan Lovelace, Trump Proposes Ethics Plan to ‘Drain the Swamp in Washington’,
WASH. EXAM’R (Oct. 17, 2016, 9:39 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-
proposes-ethics-plan-to-drain-the-swamp-in-washington [https://perma.cc/VZQ7-6QAS].
5. Corruption in the USA: The Difference a Year Makes, TRANSPARENCY INT’L
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_in_the_usa_the_
difference_a_year_makes [https://perma.cc/D8NL-6GJ5].
6. Americas: Weakening Democracy and Rise in Populism Hinder Anti-Corruption Efforts,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/cpi-2018-
regional-analysis-americas [https://perma.cc/D39Z-TWM2].
7. The National Weather Service estimates that an American has a one in 15,300 
chance to be struck by lightning in their lifetime. How Dangerous Is Lightning?, NAT’L
WEATHER SERV., https://www.weather.gov/safety/lightning-odds [https://perma.cc/PWC6-
H474] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020). As discussed below, approximately 10 federal employees 
per year are subject to civil or criminal actions for violating ethics laws. See infra Part III. The 
average federal employee tenure is 13.51 years. Profile of Federal Civilian Non-Postal Employees,
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This Article considers whether the current structure of ethics 
rules and enforcement makes sense from a perspective of both de-
terring wrongdoing and encouraging public confidence in gov-
ernment. The Article concludes that the problem is not one of 
substantive laws and rules—rather, it is a deficiency of process.
Given the vast public attention paid to government ethics, in-
depth scholarship on the subject has been surprisingly sparse in 
the past decade.8 This Article aims to fill that gap by providing a 
comprehensive overview of the structure of federal ethics regula-
tion and enforcement and discussing possible reforms.
This Article will concentrate on the largest component of Amer-
ican government from both a fiscal and manpower perspective: the 
federal executive branch. Although subject to many similar stand-
ards of behavior, and also the focus of considerable public atten-
tion, the courts, Congress, and state and local government will be
left for another day. Likewise, although federal lobbying law is a 
key ethical standard, it primarily governs the activities of private 
individuals and organizations communicating with government of-
ficials,9 while the focus here is on how the officials themselves are 
restricted.
OPM (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-
documentation/federal-employment-reports/reports-publications/profile-of-federal-civilian-
non-postal-employees [https://perma.cc/WEH5-WMHJ]. There are approximately 2.1 mil-
lion civilian employees in the executive branch not including postal service employees. JULIE 
JENNINGS & JARED C. NAGEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43590, FEDERAL WORKFORCE STATISTICS 
SOURCES: OPM AND OMB 6 (2019).
Accordingly, over the course of an average federal employee’s tenure, about 135 civil-
ian executive branch employees—about one in 19,800—will be subject to an enforcement 
action.
8. For counterexamples, see Alice Bartek-Santiago, Humanizing Federal Ethics: Motivat-
ing and Mobilizing Compliance Through Creative Outreach, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 713 (2018); 
Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts Of Interest in Government and 
Business, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1637 (2011); Kathleen Clark, Ethics, Employees and Contractors: Fi-
nancial Conflicts of Interest in and Out of Government, 62 ALA. L. REV. 961 (2011); and RICHARD 
W. PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES: HOW ETHICS REFORM CAN MAKE 
A DIFFERENCE (2009). In addition, the American Law Institute has been developing a set of 
Principles of the Law on government ethics. The author is a participant in the Members 
Consultative Group for this Principles project.
A notable, if narrow, exception to the limited recent scholarship on government ethics 
is a minor explosion of commentary on the Constitution’s Emoluments Clause following the 
election of President Trump. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, The Lawyers Who Mistook the President for 
Their Client, 52 IND. L. REV. 271 (2019); Don Mayer & Adam Sulkowski, The U.S. Constitution’s
Emoluments Clauses: How History, Behavioral Psychology, and the Framers’ Understanding of Corrup-
tion All Require an End to President Trump’s Conflicts of Interest, 7 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 257 
(2018); Kimberly Breedon & A. Christopher Bryant, Restoring Trust with Trusts: Constructive 
and Blind Trusts as Remedies for Presidential Violations of the Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses, 11 
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 284 (2018); Amandeep S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the 
Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. 639 (2017); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of 
“Emoluments” in the Constitution, 52 GA. L. REV. 1 (2017).
9. See generally 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1614; Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance, OFF. OF THE 
CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://lobbying
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the key ethics stand-
ards that apply to federal executive branch officials and the three 
sources they derive from: statutes, regulations, and presidential 
ethics pledges. Part II describes the federal infrastructure that 
oversees and enforces ethics standards. Part III discusses the meth-
ods of enforcement—regulatory, criminal, and otherwise—and the 
extent of enforcement. Part IV addresses possible changes to the 
current enforcement and compliance mechanisms. In particular, it 
looks at the current ethics system through the lens of criminal de-
terrence theory and considers whether current processes and prac-
tices match up with what deterrence theory tells us are the most—
and least—effective ways to discourage wrongdoing and to pro-
mote public trust in government officials. This Article focuses not 
on whether the current ethical standards are substantively good or 
bad, but rather on whether the system is set up effectively to ensure 
that government employees follow those standards.
I. THE FEDERAL ETHICAL STANDARDS
The disconnect between the federal government’s vast array of 
ethical standards and the widespread perception that corruption in 
government is endemic has been observed for decades. As one 
commentator put it in 1990:
[O]ver-regulation of government ethics can be harmful to 
the greater public interest, not merely unnecessary or bur-
densome to public employees. We may all lose when every 
encounter with the government becomes an exercise in
narrow, “safe” conduct designed to prevent becoming per-
sonally trapped in a too wide, but tightly knit, prosecutorial 
net.10
Or, as Kathleen Clark put it nine years later:
While the amount of ethics regulation has increased, the 
public’s trust in government has decreased. Adding more 
ethics regulation actually may be counterproductive. It dis-
disclosure.house.gov/amended_lda_guide.html [https://perma.cc/RL2P-MG75]; THE 
LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LOBBYING LAW AND PRACTICE (Rebecca 
H. Gordon & Thomas M. Susman eds., 5th ed. 2016) (providing an overview of federal lob-
bying law).
10. Beth Nolan, Regulating Government Ethics: When It’s Not Enough to Just Say No, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 405, 414 (1990).
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tracts both government officials and the public from the 
more general goal of protecting the public trust.11
Or, as a government ethics lawyer himself complained a decade af-
ter that: “[T]here are numerous criminal and civil statutes address-
ing corruption and ethics, and there is an extensive and detailed 
code of conduct for the executive branch that proscribes and pre-
scribes employee conduct in minute and sometimes mind-
numbing detail.”12 Rather, as the lawyer continued:
The ever-present news reports of misconduct by govern-
ment officials amply illustrate that the government’s coer-
cive approach to ethics has neither prevented notorious 
and outrageous corruption by government officials, nor re-
duced cynicism about government service. More likely, the 
government’s heavily regulated workplace has led to what 
[former Bush White House ethics head] Richard Painter 
has described as “superficial compliance,” where employees 
learn to navigate around the detailed rules instead of com-
plying with the broader ethical principles involved.13
Ethics standards for federal executive branch employees derive 
from three primary sources: statutes, regulations, and executive 
orders. The key standards are summarized in this Part.
A. Ethics Statutes
The modern structure of federal ethics laws can be traced to 
Congress’s enactment in 1962 of criminal statutes on bribery, con-
flicting financial interests, and other prohibitions.14 In addition, 
much of the current legal framework of government ethics derives 
from the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, enacted in the wake of 
Watergate.15 Among other things, the Act created the Office of 
Government Ethics (OGE), which was in turn empowered to 
11. K. Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary 
Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 61–62.
12. James M. Lager, Overcoming Cultures of Compliance to Reduce Corruption and Achieve 
Ethics in Government, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 63, 64 (2009).
13. Id. at 65–66.
14. Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119; see also Memorandum from 
Pres. John F. Kennedy to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 22, 1963).
15. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599); see also 35th Anniversary of the Ethics in Government Act,
U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS (Nov. 8, 2013), https://oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf/Resources/35th
+Anniversary+of+the+Ethics+in+Government+Act [https://perma.cc/G8R7-YZRS].
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promulgate an array of ethics regulations.16 The 1978 Act also re-
quired federal officials to submit financial disclosure forms listing 
their assets, income, and other information.17 Eleven years later, 
Congress passed the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which established 
additional restrictions on, among other things, the activities of 
former officials.18
The primary federal ethics statutes, and the standards they en-
force, are summarized below. The violation of these statutes sub-
jects officials not only to employment discipline and civil penalties 
but also potential criminal prosecution.
First, perhaps the key ethics statute for current executive branch 
employees is 18 U.S.C. § 208, which governs financial conflicts of 
interest.19 OGE has promulgated extensive regulations implement-
ing and clarifying the meaning and application of § 208.20 The 
statute provides that, with certain exceptions, an official who 
participates personally and substantially as a Government 
officer or employee, . . . in a . . . particular matter in which, 
to his knowledge, he, his spouse, minor child, general 
partner, organization in which he is serving as officer, di-
rector, trustee, general partner or employee, or any person 
or organization with whom he is negotiating or has any ar-
rangement concerning prospective employment, has a fi-
nancial interest,
is subject to criminal penalties.21 The law contains several excep-
tions,22 the most notable one since 2016 being that the President is 
exempt from the law entirely.23
Second, the supplementation-of-income statute, 18 U.S.C. § 209, 
restricts federal employees from receiving—and private parties 
from providing—additional salary or other income on top of the 
official’s government pay. For example, a wealthy friend of an in-
coming federal official, proud of the friend’s willingness to serve in 
public service and sympathetic to a civil servant’s relatively low pay, 
16. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 401(a), 402.
17. Id. §§ 101–112.
18. Ethics Reform Act of Nov. 3, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-94, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2, 3, 5, 10, 18, 22, 26, 28, 31, 37, 41, 42 and 50 U.S.C.).
19. See generally Adam Raviv, Christopher Babbitt, Blake Roberts & Molly Jennings, Offi-
cials Must Note Financial Conflict of Interest Law, LAW360 (May 25, 2008), https://www.
law360.com/articles/1047300 [https://perma.cc/39E6-66TH] (discussing the application 
of 18 U.S.C. § 208 to federal officials).
20. 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.401–403, 2640 (2018).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a).
22. Id. § 208(b); 5 C.F.R. § 2640.203–304 (2018).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 202(c).
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cannot give his friend an extra $50,000 per year on top of the em-
ployee’s government salary; under such an arrangement, both the 
official and the wealthy friend would be violating § 209 even if the 
friend neither seeks nor receives any official favors in return for 
the salary bump.
Third, the key ethics statute that applies to former government 
officials is 18 U.S.C. § 207, the so-called revolving-door statute.24
The statute and its implementing regulations25 are aimed at re-
stricting the post-government employment activities of former sen-
ior government officials and limiting their ability to profit from the 
connections they made and the confidential information they 
learned while in government. The statute contains various prohibi-
tions, some of them time-limited and some of them permanent.
For example, the statute prohibits former officials from contacting 
the federal government with respect to particular matters involving
specific parties on which they worked while in government;26 pro-
hibits former officials from contacting the government for two 
years on any matters that fell within their “official responsibility”
during their last year in government;27 prohibits certain “senior 
personnel” from contacting senior officials at their former agen-
cies about any matter for one year after leaving government;28 and 
extends a broader two-year restriction to certain “very senior” per-
sonnel, generally cabinet-level officers and very senior White 
House officials.29 There are also restrictions relating to trade and 
treaty negotiations and representing foreign governments.30
Fourth, the Ethics in Government Act imposes significant finan-
cial disclosure requirements on federal officials. Senior executive 
branch officials must file periodic reports that provide extensive 
information on their financial holdings, sources of income, liabili-
ties, and transactions, along with those of their immediate family.31
These reports are made publicly available.32 Less senior officials 
must file confidential financial disclosure forms, which are some-
what less detailed.33
24. See generally Christopher Babbitt, Thomas W. White & Blake Roberts, Considerations 
When Hiring Executive Branch Employees, LAW360 (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.law360.com
/articles/854042 [https://perma.cc/WN6K-BP36]; PAINTER, supra note 8, at 47–59.
25. 5 C.F.R. § 2641 (2018).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
27. Id. § 207(a)(2).
28. Id. § 207(c).
29. Id. § 207(d).
30. Id. § 207(b), (f).
31. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101–103; see also 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.201–311 (2018).
32. 5 U.S.C. app. § 105.
33. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.901–909 (2018).
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Fifth, two statutes restrict federal officials from privately repre-
senting others before the government.34 First, 18 U.S.C. § 203 pro-
hibits any current government official from acting as a paid repre-
sentative in any matter where the United States is a party or has a 
direct and substantial interest—for example, by lobbying the gov-
ernment or acting as counsel to a private client in litigation where 
the United States is a party.35 Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 205 prohibits 
any federal official from acting “as agent or attorney for prosecut-
ing any claim against the United States” or acting “as agent or at-
torney for anyone before any department, agency, court, court-
martial, officer, or civil, military, or naval commission in connec-
tion with any [particular] matter in which the United States is a 
party or has a direct and substantial interest.”36
Finally, bribery is perhaps the archetypal example of public cor-
ruption, provides one of the Constitution’s grounds for impeach-
ment,37 and implicates the most basic and intuitive common no-
tions of ethics in government. The federal bribery and gratuity 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, prohibits anyone from offering, and pro-
hibits a public official from accepting, anything of value in return 
for or because of an “official act.”38
B. Ethics Regulations
Pursuant to its statutory authority granted in the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act and elsewhere, OGE has promulgated, and periodi-
cally amended, extensive ethics rules for executive branch employ-
ees. OGE’s ethics regulations are codified primarily at 5 C.F.R. 
§ 2635, which first took effect in 1993 and has undergone a num-
ber of amendments since.
Some of the key ethics regulations are summarized below. These 
are in addition to the regulations that directly implement and in-
terpret the separate ethics statutes.
The first subpart of OGE’s ethics rules outlines the basic obliga-
tions of public officials. It provides that every executive branch 
employee “has a responsibility to the United States Government 
and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical 
principles above private gain,” and that “each employee shall re-
spect and adhere to the principles of ethical conduct set forth in 
34. See PAINTER, supra note 8, at 26–30.
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 203.
36. Id. § 205(a).
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 201.
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this section.”39 It then lists fourteen “general principles” that “apply 
to every employee and may form the basis for the standards con-
tained in” the ethics regulations.40 These principles generally re-
quire employees to do their jobs diligently and honestly and avoid 
conflicts of interest.
Second, OGE regulations generally prohibit various ways in 
which officials might misuse their positions.41 For example, em-
ployees may not use their public office for private gain for them-
selves or others by, for instance, coercing others to give them fi-
nancial benefits or endorsing “products, services or enterprises.”42
It also prohibits the equivalent of insider trading, through “a fi-
nancial transaction using nonpublic information.”43 Officials also 
may not improperly use government property or use their “official 
time” except to “perform official duties.”44
Third, ethics rules restrict the ability of executive branch em-
ployees to solicit or accept “gifts” from certain sources.45 The fed-
eral gift rule, most recently amended in 2017, generally provides 
that an employee may not solicit or accept a gift from certain 
sources, or from anyone when the gift is “given because of the em-
ployee’s official position.”46 “Gift” is defined broadly under the rule 
as encompassing “any gratuity, favor, discount, entertainment, 
hospitality, loan, forbearance, or other item having monetary val-
ue.”47
Fourth, OGE’s impartiality rule generally restricts officials from 
participating in certain matters where they have a relationship with 
someone who is or represents a party to that matter.48 In essence, 
this regulation provides that an official normally should not partic-
ipate in a particular matter involving specific parties where (1) the 
matter will affect the financial interests of a member of the offi-
cial’s household, or (2) someone with whom the official has a 
“covered relationship” is or represents a party to the matter, if do-
ing so would create an appearance of impropriety in the mind of a
39. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(a) (2018).
40. Id. § 2635.101(b).
41. See id. §§ 2635.701–705.
42. Id. § 2635.702. In 2017, White House counselor Kellyanne Conway ran afoul of this 
rule when, during a Fox News segment, she spoke positively about presidential daughter 
Ivanka Trump’s clothing line. See, e.g., Valentina Zarya, Kellyanne Conway’s Endorsement of 
Ivanka Trump’s Clothing Line May Be Unethical, FORTUNE (Feb. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com
/2017/02/09/ivanka-trump-nordstrom-kellyanne-conway [https://perma.cc/3F2M-MU98].
43. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.703(a) (2018).
44. See id. §§ 2635.704, 2635.705(a).
45. See id. §§ 2635.201–206; see also PAINTER, supra note 8, at 16–26.
46. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202 (2018).
47. Id. § 2635.203(b).
48. See id. § 2635.502(a).
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“reasonable person” with knowledge of the relevant facts and cir-
cumstances.
Fifth, OGE’s “extraordinary payment” regulation is effectively an 
extension of the supplementation-of-income statute to payments 
made before the official entered government. It provides that “an
employee shall be disqualified for two years from participating in 
any particular matter in which a former employer is a party or rep-
resents a party if he received an extraordinary payment from that 
person prior to entering Government service.”49 The regulation de-
fines “extraordinary payment” as a payment worth over $10,000 
that is made to an official “[o]n the basis of a determination made 
after it became known to the former employer that the individual 
was being considered for or had accepted a Government position,”
and “[o]ther than pursuant to the former employer’s established 
compensation, partnership, or benefits program.”50
Sixth, the “seeking employment” regulation provides that, with 
certain exceptions, a federal employee “may not participate per-
sonally and substantially in a particular matter that, to the employ-
ee’s knowledge, has a direct and predictable effect on the financial 
interests of a prospective employer with whom the employee is 
seeking employment.”51
Finally, ethics regulations restrict the ability of federal officials to 
engage in certain activities outside their government roles.52 For 
example, in a restriction similar—and perhaps somewhat redun-
dant—to certain other regulations, an employee cannot “engage in 
outside employment or any other outside activity that conflicts with 
his official duties.”53 Presidential appointees and the other senior 
officials face a more substantial restriction: Presidential appointees 
cannot “receive any outside earned income for outside employ-
ment, or for any other outside activity, performed during that Pres-
idential appointment,”54 and other senior officials’ outside earned 
income is highly restrained.55
C. Presidential Ethics Pledges
On top of existing ethics statutes and regulations, recent presi-
dential administrations have also issued executive orders that re-
49. Id. § 2635.503(a); see also PAINTER, supra note 8, at 52–53.
50. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.503(b)(1) (2018).
51. Id. § 2635.604(a)(1).
52. See id. §§ 2635.801–809.
53. Id. § 2635.802.
54. Id. § 2635.804(a).
55. See id. § 2635.804(b).
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quired senior officials to sign “ethics pledges.”56 The first was issued 
by President Clinton in 1993 as Executive Order 12834, entitled 
“Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Appointees.” It includ-
ed:
1. A five-year ban on former officials’ lobbying of their former 
agencies;
2. A lifetime ban on former officials’ lobbying for or represent-
ing foreign governments or political parties in a manner 
that would require registration under the Foreign Agent’s
Registration Act; and
3. A five-year ban on former government officials’ advising or 
representing a foreign government, political party, or entity 
when those officials participated in trade negotiations.57
The day after he took office in 2009, President Obama issued 
Executive Order 13490 and required all full-time political appoin-
tees in the administration to sign the Ethics Pledge it contained. In 
signing the Obama Ethics Pledge, officials made the following 
primary commitments, most of which were variations on or exten-
sions of existing rules and laws:
1. Not to accept gifts from registered lobbyists or lobbying or-
ganizations;
2. For two years after entering government, not to participate 
personally and substantially in any particular matter involv-
ing specific parties “that is directly and substantially related 
to my former employer or former clients;”
3. Restrictions on the ability of former registered lobbyists to 
take government roles in areas that they lobbied;
4. An extension of the one-year “revolving door” lobbying ban 
under 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) to two years;
5. For officials leaving government, agreeing “not to lobby any 
covered executive branch official or non-career Senior Ex-
ecutive Service appointee for the remainder of the Admin-
istration;” and
6. Agreeing “that any hiring or other employment decisions I 
56. See generally JACOB R. STRAUS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44974, ETHICS PLEDGES AND 
OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH APPOINTEE RESTRICTIONS SINCE 1993: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE,
CURRENT PRACTICES, AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE (2017) (discussing ethics pledges in recent 
administrations).
57. Exec. Order No. 12,834, 58 Fed. Reg. 5911 (Jan. 20, 1993).
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make will be based on the candidate’s qualifications, compe-
tence, and experience.”58
On taking office in 2017, President Trump issued his own ethics 
pledge for political appointees. Though announced with great 
“drain the swamp” fanfare, Trump’s ethics pledge borrowed heavi-
ly from both the Clinton and Obama pledges. It essentially re-
tained Clinton items #1 and 2 above and Obama items #1, 2, 3, and 
659 and expanded them slightly in a few respects.60 Most significant-
ly, the restriction on former officials lobbying senior officials for 
the remainder of the administration was expanded to cover not 
only direct lobbying but also “lobbying activities,” including be-
hind-the-scenes advice relating to lobbying.61 As of 2018, according 
to OGE statistics, 2,559 officials had signed the Trump Ethics 
Pledge.62
In January 2021, as this Article went to press, President Biden 
issued an Executive Order requiring political appointees to sign an 
Ethics Pledge similar to the Obama Administration’s.63 And on the 
final day of his presidency, President Trump rescinded the Execu-
tive Order establishing his own Ethics Pledge, thereby releasing his 
former appointees from their continuing Pledge obligations, in-
cluding the five-year ban on lobbying their former agencies.64
II. THE FEDERAL ETHICS INFRASTRUCTURE
Every law or rule is only as good as the mechanisms for ensuring 
compliance and addressing violations. Each agency of the federal 
58. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009).
59. Exec. Order No. 13,770, 82 Fed. Reg. 9333 (Jan. 28, 2017).
60. For a comparison of the Obama and Trump ethics pledges, see Kathleen Clark, 
Illusory Ethics: Trump’s Ethics Executive Order, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 29, 2017), 
https://illinoislawreview.org/symposium/first-100-days/illusory-ethics [https://perma.cc
/ND94-JBY6].
61. Exec. Order No. 13,770, 82 Fed. Reg. 9333 (Jan. 28, 2017) (restricting “lobbying 
activities” as defined in the Lobbying Disclosure Act). The Lobbying Disclosure Act defines 
“lobbying activities” as “lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including 
preparation and planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, 
at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities 
of others.” 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7).
62. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, CY17 ANNUAL AGENCY ETHICS PROGRAM 
QUESTIONNAIRE 5 (2018), https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf/accessdocs_summary-reports
(click “Summary Report (CY17) (PDF)”) [https://perma.cc/DY45-RBLX].
63. Exec. Order No. 13,989, 86 Fed. Reg. 7027 (Jan. 20, 2021), and:  
https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/trump-revokes-lobbying-ban-after-promising-to-
drain-the -swamp.
64. Justin Sink, Trump Revokes Lobbying Ban After Promising to ‘Drain the Swamp,’
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www/bloombergquint.com/politics/trump-
revokes-lobbying-ban-promising-to-drain-the-swamp.
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government has its own ethics officers; in addition, the OGE over-
sees ethics generally across the executive branch and issues gov-
ernment-wide ethics regulations such as those discussed in Section
I.B above. This Part describes the federal ethics infrastructure as 
currently organized and operated—and the costs and burdens of 
this regime.
A. The Office of Government Ethics
OGE was established by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.65
According to its implementing regulations, “OGE exercises leader-
ship in the executive branch of the Federal Government to prevent 
conflicts of interest on the part of executive branch employees and 
resolve those conflicts of interest that do occur.”66
OGE has about seventy-five employees and is headed by a direc-
tor who is appointed to a Senate-confirmed, five-year term and re-
ports directly to the President.67 OGE also has a general counsel’s
office and various officials who communicate with other executive 
branch agencies, Congress, and the public regarding ethics polices 
and rules.68 In addition, OGE’s Compliance Division oversees eth-
ics programs in executive branch agencies and manages aspects of 
the executive branch public financial disclosure program.69
Over the years, OGE has energetically implemented regulations
and practices that helped cement its leadership on ethics matters 
throughout the executive branch.70 OGE employees frequently in-
terface with ethics officials in agencies throughout the government 
to discuss the interpretation and implementation of ethical stand-
ards.71 Among other things, they request and compile information 
65. See generally Our History, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICs, https://www.oge.gov/web
/oge.nsf/about_our-history [https://perma.cc/4KQR-4MLV] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020); 
PAINTER, supra note 8, at 70–77.
66. 5 C.F.R. § 2600.101(a) (2018). For an overview of OGE’s function and self-
described mission, see U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2018-22 1 
(2018), https://www.oge.gov/web/OGE.nsf/0/5F2BA63E1DDF407D852585B6005A1E14
/$FILE/Finished%202018-22%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZS4-JY46].
67. See generally Organization, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www2.oge.gov/web/
oge.nsf/Organization [https://perma.cc/W3VN-QYM9] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); U.S.
OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, CHIEF FOIA OFFICER REPORT FOR U.S. OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT 





70. See generally 5 C.F.R. ch. XVI (2018).
71. See generally Mission and Responsibilities, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICs, https:
//www2.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Mission%20and%20Responsibilities [https://perma.cc
/KTZ8-VWCT] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
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on agency ethics programs.72 OGE also issues numerous public le-
gal advisories on how ethics standards should be applied.73 Over-
seeing the executive branch financial disclosure program is also a 
major component of OGE’s work.74
OGE’s website makes clear what is—and is not—the agency’s
mission: “The U.S. Office of Government Ethics (OGE) does not 
handle complaints of misconduct, nor does OGE have investigative 
or prosecutorial authority. OGE’s mission is one of prevention.”75
After the 2016 presidential election, OGE gained a higher pro-
file than ever before. A few weeks after the election, OGE issued a 
series of tweets from its official Twitter account that “congratulat-
ed” President-Elect Trump for his supposed decision to divest his 
personal businesses (which he did not, in fact, do). In a tweetstorm 
on the morning of November 30, 2016, OGE declared:
.@realDonaldTrump We can’t repeat enough how good 
this total divestiture will be76
.@realDonaldTrump Brilliant! Divestiture is good for you, 
very good for America!77
.@realDonaldTrump OGE applauds the “total” divestiture 
decision. Bravo!78
.@realDonalTrump As we discussed with your counsel, di-
vestiture is the way to resolve these conflicts.79
.@realDonaldTrump OGE is delighted that you’ve decided 
to divest your businesses. Right decision!80
72. See id.
73. See Legal Advisories, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www2.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf
/Legal%20Advisories [https://perma.cc/6JCY-NF8E] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
74. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 106; 5 C.F.R. § 2634 (2018).
75. Where to Report Misconduct, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICs, https://www2.oge.gov/
web/oge.nsf/Resources/Where+to+Report+Misconduct [https://perma.cc/8HMQ-DJQK] 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
76. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM), 
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020923519012864.
77. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM), 
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020923548303360.
78. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM), 
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020923703533568.
79. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM), 
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020923800158209.
80. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM), 
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020924089438208.
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.@realDonaldTrump Bravo! Only way to resolve these con-
flicts of interest is to divest . Good call!81
.@realDonaldTrump this aligns with OGE opinion that 
POTUS should act as if 18 USC 208 applies. . . .82
.@realDonaldTrump this divestiture does what handing 
over control could never have done.83
.@realDonaldTrump - we told your counsel we’d sing your 
praises if you divested, we meant it.84
It is a matter of judgment whether the tone of these tweets was 
encouraging or sarcastic. They were later revealed to have been 
personally authored by OGE’s then-Director Walter Shaub, who 
acknowledged they were deliberately written in the style of Presi-
dent Trump’s own tweets.85
The outspoken Director was only getting started. At a forum 
held at the Brookings Institution nine days before Trump’s inau-
guration, Shaub made a thirteen-minute speech in which he criti-
cized Trump’s refusal to divest his personal businesses upon taking 
office and the conflicts of interest that Shaub said would arise as a 
result of this refusal.86
OGE’s standoff with the new administration continued after 
President Trump’s inauguration. In April 2017, OGE issued a data 
call to all executive branch agency heads, Designated Agency Eth-
ics Officials, inspectors general, and the White House. OGE sought 
copies of ethics waivers and authorizations that had been issued to 
political appointees over the previous twelve months, including 
waivers granted under the financial conflict of interest statute, the 
impartiality regulation, and the Trump and Obama ethics pledg-
81. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM), 
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020925171646464.
82. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:55 PM), 
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804020925893054464.
83. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:57 PM), 
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804021426311180288.
84. U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (@OfficeGovEthics), TWITTER (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:57 PM), 
https://twitter.com/OfficeGovEthics/status/804021427565395969.
85. Lisa Rein, Federal Ethics Chief Blasts Trump’s Plan to Break From Businesses, Calling It 
‘Meaningless,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2017, 6:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/powerpost/wp/2017/01/11/federal-ethics-chief-blasts-trumps-plan-to-break-from-
businesses-calling-it-meaningless [https://perma.cc/65RR-EN6A].
86. Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Dir., U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics, Remarks at Brookings Institu-
tion (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/20170111_
oge_shaub_remarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7SW-42Z5].
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es.87 In response to the data call, the Director of the White House 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) sent OGE a short letter 
asserting that the data call “appears to raise legal questions regard-
ing the scope of OGE’s authorities” and saying that the DOJ “may 
need to be consulted . . . on the scope of the authorities underly-
ing OGE’s data call.”88 OGE responded with a ten-page letter that 
characterized OMB’s letter as “requesting that [OGE] suspend its 
inquiry into the practices of agency ethics programs and, separate-
ly, the activities of individual appointees.”89 The letter went on to 
provide, in detail, OGE’s view of its authority to collect the re-
quested information from the White House.90 OMB’s Director re-
sponded with a letter saying the White House would provide the 
requested information and denying that OGE’s authority to re-
quest that information had been questioned.91
In July 2017, Shaub resigned as OGE Director, saying in an in-
terview that “the current situation has made it clear that the ethics 
program needs to be stronger than it is.”92 He was replaced as Act-
ing Director by the then-General Counsel of the Office, and a full-
time Director was sworn in a year later.93
87. Memorandum from Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Dir., U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics, to Chief of 
Staff to the President, Agency Heads, Designated Agency Ethics Offs., Inspectors Gen. & 
Appointees (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www2.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/All%20Documents/5B5
DECAECCE6CB8185258110007ADC76/$FILE/PA-17-02.pdf?open [https://perma.cc
/FU5S-ZU98].
88. Letter from Mick Mulvaney, Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to Walter M. Shaub, Jr., 
Dir., U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics (May 17, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org
/documents/3727995/OMB-Director-Mulvaney-Letter-to-Office-of.pdf [https://perma.cc
/NC7W-ZQ4L]. The letter cc’d all agency general counsels and Designated Agency Ethics 
Officials.
89. Letter from Walter M. Shaub, Jr., Dir., U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics, to Mick Mulvaney, 




91. Matea Gold, White House Relents in Fight with Ethics Office over Waiver Disclosure, WASH.
POST (May 27, 2017, 8:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/
wp/2017/05/27/white-house-relents-in-fight-with-ethics-office-over-waiver-disclosure [https:
//perma.cc/A5T7-5MNC].
92. Peter Overby & Marilyn Geewax, Ethics Office Director Walter Shaub Resigns, Saying 
Rules Need to Be Tougher, NPR (July 6, 2017, 1:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/06
/535781749/ethics-office-director-walter-shaub-resigns-saying-rules-need-to-be-tougher
[https://perma.cc/3KVC-66KX].
93. U.S. SENATE, 115 CONG., EXECUTIVE CALENDAR NO. 913 (2018), 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/executive_calendar/2018/07_12_2018.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/3CN2-J9LT].
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B. Agency Ethics Offices
The vast majority of ethics officials in the federal government 
are not part of OGE but rather work in individual agencies.94 As of 
2018, federal agencies reported 1,027 employees who spent at least 
twenty-one hours a week performing “ethics program duties.”95
Another 872 employees worked eleven to twenty hours a week on 
ethics matters.96
OGE regulations provide that “[e]ach agency head must appoint 
a Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO). The DAEO is the 
employee with primary responsibility for directing the daily activi-
ties of the agency’s ethics program and coordinating with the Of-
fice of Government Ethics.”97 The DAEO must generally be a sen-
ior official. For example, in agencies with at least 1,000 employees, 
the DAEO must at least be at the Senior Executive Service level.98
DAEOs and those under their supervision are responsible for a 
wide range of ethics-related areas, including counseling agency 
employees on ethics laws and regulations, resolving conflicts of in-
terest, administering the public financial disclosure program, and 
enforcing ethics laws and regulations.99 To back up the DAEO, 
agencies also must appoint an Alternate Designated Agency Ethics 
Official, or ADEAO.100 At most agencies, the DAEO or ADAEO 
oversees the other ethics officials.101
Most agency ethics officials, who are typically career civil serv-
ants, report directly or indirectly to agency general counsel, who 
are normally political appointees. Richard Painter explains that 
agency officials typically take a more conservative and cautious ap-
proach to ethics issues than their political appointee bosses, and 
frequently get their way despite their subordinate relationship:
The dynamic between ethics officers and their general 
counsels often resembles that between career and political 
appointees elsewhere in the government. Agency ethics of-
94. See generally PAINTER, supra note 8, at 77–80.
95. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, RESULTS FROM THE 2018 ANNUAL AGENCY ETHICS 
PROGRAM QUESTIONNAIRE: A SNAPSHOT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS PROGRAM 10 
(2019), https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf/accessdocs_summary-reports (click “Summary 
Report (CY18) (PDF)”) [https://perma.cc/S9LS-HCZU].
96. Id. More than five thousand employees did some ethics-related work but less than 
10 hours per week. Id.
97. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(a) (2018).
98. Id. § 2638.104(b)(4).
99. Id. § 2638.104(c).
100. Id. § 2638.104(d).
101. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95 (summing the total number of agency 
ethics officials in the executive branch).
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ficials will usually be in the government long after the de-
parture of the political appointees to whom they report. 
They typically have a conservative approach to interpreting 
legal rules, a tendency to cast prohibition broadly and in-
terpret exceptions narrowly and a strong preference for 
avoiding the appearance of impropriety. They may be less 
likely than lawyers who are political appointees, to give de-
cision makers the widest possible latitude. Most political 
appointees, nonetheless, are reluctant to overrule ethics of-
ficers because of the potentially high political cost of reject-
ing ethics advice and being wrong.102
Agency ethics officials do not, however, deal with every policy and 
personnel matter that could implicate ethical questions. Such top-
ics as “preservation of email and other records, . . . handling of 
classified information including the identity of covert intelligence 
operatives, destruction of tape recordings and other documents, 
coordination between agency officials and their paid surrogates in 
the media, and the hiring and firing of political and career em-
ployees,” are generally outside the purview of ethics officials.103
C. Other Officials Responsible for Ethics Breaches
In addition to OGE and agency ethics offices, other components 
of the federal government also play an important role in the feder-
al ethics infrastructure.
For example, as with other federal criminal violations, the DOJ
has sole authority to prosecute violations of the criminal ethics 
statutes. It also has sole authority to bring civil enforcement actions 
against violators. The frequency with which it exercises this author-
ity and the process it follows are discussed below.
Agency inspectors general also play a key role in identifying eth-
ics violations as part of their larger statutory mission to protect 
agency integrity and efficiency.104 Because they tend to have greater 
investigative resources and investigative authority than agency eth-
ics offices, inspectors general offices frequently are on the front 
lines of detecting—and publicizing—ethics issues.105
102. PAINTER, supra note 8, at 77–78.
103. Id. at 79.
104. See generally Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 3); Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
409, 122 Stat. 4302.
105. Disclosure: the author’s spouse is an investigative attorney with a federal inspector 
general’s office.
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Finally, the U.S. Office of Special Counsel is a small independ-
ent agency focused on four statutes that apply to federal employ-
ees: the Civil Service Reform Act, the Whistleblower Protection 
Act, the Hatch Act, and the Uniformed Services Employment & 
Reemployment Rights Act.106 In 2019, the Office of Special Counsel 
garnered rare front-page attention when it publicly recommended 
that President Trump fire his counselor Kellyanne Conway after 
identifying multiple violations of the Hatch Act, which restricts 
public officials from using their official positions for political activi-
ties.107 The President declined to follow this recommendation.108
D. The Burden of Compliance
This substantial federal ethics infrastructure creates considera-
ble costs and burdens of compliance. Setting aside the money and 
resources devoted to employing the thousands of ethics officers 
across the government, employees subject to the rules are also 
burdened. The largest, or at least most regularized, ethics-related 
burden on federal employees is the annual financial disclosure re-
ports each senior executive branch official must submit. As com-
mentators have put it:
A great deal of effort is expended by government officials, 
their lawyers, their agencies, and the OGE to determine 
what does and does not have to be reported on the Form 
278 and when investments such as hedge funds and private 
equity funds have to be broken out on the form into their 
component parts. For wealthy filers, often political appoin-
tees at the highest levels of government, Form 278 can be 
dozens of pages long.109
Or, in the words of Richard Painter:
106. See About OSC, U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS., https://osc.gov/Pages/about.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VJ84-HJZP] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
107. OSC Finds Kellyanne Conway Repeatedly Violated the Hatch Act, Recommends Removal from 
Federal Service, U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNS. (June 13, 2019), https://osc.gov/News/Pages
/19-10-Kellyanne-Conway-Hatch-Act.aspx [https://perma.cc/UU6Z-T7ZN]; U.S. OFF. OF 
SPECIAL COUNS., REPORT OF PROHIBITED POLITICAL ACTIVITY UNDER THE HATCH ACT: OSC
FILE NOS. HA-19-0631 & HA-19-3395 (KELLYANNE CONWAY) (2019), https://int.nyt.com/data
/documenthelper/1169-osc-report-on-kellyanne-conway/11f2a2d73d1e14d197f3/optimized
/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GFY-PG3T].
108. John Wagner & Michelle Y.H. Lee, Trump Says He Won’t Fire Kellyanne Conway over 
Hatch Act Violations, WASH. POST (June 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/trump-says-he-wont-fire-kellyanne-conway-over-hatch-act-violations/2019/06/14/76f31a94-
8e9f-11e9-adf3-f70f78c156e8_story.html [https://perma.cc/E4ZC-947N].
109. Hill & Painter, supra note 8, at 1663–64.
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Ethics professionals at OGE and executive branch agencies 
spend a lot of time determining whether long lists of in-
vestments held by wealthy officials and nominees are 
properly disclosed, even when the likelihood that these in-
vestments would influence official decision making is ex-
tremely remote.110
According to OGE, in 2018, federal employees submitted 25,935
public financial disclosure forms and 353,300 confidential finan-
cial disclosure forms.111 The “Public Burden Information” on the 
relevant forms estimates that filling out public financial disclosure 
form 278e takes an average of ten hours and filling out confiden-
tial financial disclosure form 450 takes three hours.112 By this calcu-
lus, in 2018, federal employees spent more than 1.3 million hours 
filling out financial disclosure forms. One commentator has esti-
mated that the total annual cost of complying with financial disclo-
sure requirements, in terms of federal employee time, “could easily 
exceed $5 billion.”113
The financial disclosure program forms a major part of the work 
of federal ethics offices. In a 2017 survey, thirty-four agencies said 
that their ethics offices spent more than a quarter of their time on 
the confidential financial disclosure program, and twenty-six said 
the same about their public financial disclosure program.114 Like-
wise, financial disclosure ranked second, after gift acceptance, as 
the ethics topic which agencies reported being asked about most 
frequently.115
Notably, former OGE Director Walter Shaub, who has been oth-
erwise outspoken about how government ethics infrastructure is 
not tough enough in many respects,116 has highlighted the exces-
sive burden of financial reporting. In particular, he has argued that 
110. PAINTER, supra note 8, at 15.
111. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 23, 25.
112. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, OGE FORM 278E (2020), https://www.oge.gov/Web
/OGE.nsf/OGE%20Forms?openview (select “OGE Form 278e (July 2020 508 PDF ver-
sion)”) [https://perma.cc/PEY4-C54Z]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, OGE FORM 450 (2020),
https://www.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/OGE%20Forms?openview (select “OGE Form 450 
(Aug. 2020 508 PDF version)”) [https://perma.cc/M25U-WUN2]. A minority of confiden-
tial filers are permitted to fill out OGE-approved alternative forms, though the information 
required to be reported is generally the same and the burden is unlikely to be substantially 
different. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 62, at 30. In addition, employees with no
new financial interests from a previous filing may fill out a short form called a Confidential 
Certificate of No New Interests, form 450-A. In 2017, 50,014 employees filled out a form 450-
A. Id.
113. Lager, supra note 12, at 76.
114. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 62, at 13.
115. Id. at 23.
116. See supra Sections II.A, IV.D.
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“Congress should eliminate the requirement to disclose income 
from publicly traded assets registered with the SEC.”117
Financial disclosure is not the only burdensome aspect of the 
federal ethics compliance program. Federal regulations also re-
quire an ethics orientation for new employees in addition to annu-
al training.118 As James Lager argues: “Mandatory ethics training 
about the rules, more properly termed ‘compliance training,’ is al-
so very expensive, not just to pay for the trainers, facilitators, and 
materials, but for the time public officials must spend to attend—
but not necessarily learn the content delivered in—annual ethics 
presentations.”119
III. ENFORCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS STANDARDS:
METHODS AND PRACTICE
The federal executive branch ethics infrastructure devotes itself
overwhelmingly to compliance rather than punishment. As one 
ethics attorney put it in a recent article, “the federal ethics pro-
gram focuses on prevention rather than enforcement.”120 Likewise, 
former OGE Director Walter Shaub explains that “the existing eth-
ics program is, through and through, a prevention mechanism.”121
In fact, government ethics attorneys have no direct authority to 
penalize violators of the rules. Even if ethics officers have identi-
fied what they believe to be a violation, other components of an 
employee’s agency, and possibly officials outside the agency, must 
weigh in before any kind of administrative discipline or civil or 
criminal liability is possible: 
Neither agency ethics officials nor the OGE have authority 
to enforce federal statutory and regulatory ethics laws. In-
stead, agency ethics officials refer potential violations to the 
agency’s [Office of Inspector General] for investigation. 
When employees violate the ethics laws, the OIG may rec-
117. Letter from Walter M. Shaub, Senior Dir., Ethics, Campaign Legal Ctr., to Trey 
Gowdy, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, & Elijah E. Cummings, 
Ranking Member, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform 16 (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/W%20Shaub%20Legislative%20Proposa
l%20-%209%20November%202017_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/REF9-BPJF]
118. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.701 (2009).
119. Lager, supra note 12, at 75.
120. Bartek-Santiago, supra note 8, at 726.
121. Shaub, supra note 117, at 14.
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ommend disciplinary action or, if the violations carry crim-
inal penalties, refer matters to the Department of Justice.122
This Part describes how federal ethics standards are designed to 
be enforced and how often that actually happens.
A. Regulatory Enforcement Options
When compliance efforts fail, enforcement measures become 
necessary. OGE regulations describe the administrative enforce-
ment of violations of various ethics rules. Two overall types of en-
forcement are possible: “corrective action” and “disciplinary ac-
tion.”123
“Corrective action” is the less severe of the two. It is defined 
broadly as “any action necessary to remedy a past violation or pre-
vent a continuing violation of this part, including but not limited 
to restitution, change of assignment, disqualification, divestiture, 
termination of an activity, waiver, the creation of a qualified diver-
sified or blind trust, or counseling.”124 Although some of these 
measures might be unwanted, embarrassing, or inconvenient, 
none of them amount to outright professional penalties.
“Disciplinary action” is potentially more severe. It “include[s] 
but [is] not limited to reprimand, suspension, demotion, and re-
moval.”125 The most extreme possible outcome for a violation of
these regulations (assuming the conduct does not also violate a 
criminal statute) is the employee’s termination. The only possible 
financial penalty (other than a salary reduction resulting from a 
demotion or suspension) is the corrective action of restitution for 
ill-gotten gains.
Financial disclosure in particular allows for a variety of remedial 
measures when a conflict has been identified. According to OGE’s
annual survey of federal agencies in 2018, 540 public financial dis-
closure filers “took specific remedial actions” because of infor-
mation on a report.126 These actions included “divestiture, resigna-
tion from outside position, written disqualification, 18 U.S.C. § 208 
waiver, reassignment, etc.”127 The most common remedial actions 
(which are not forms of discipline at all but rather preventive 
measures) were recusal from particular matters, followed by divest-
122. Bartek-Santiago, supra note 8, at 726.
123. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.106(a) (2018).
124. Id. § 2635.102(e).
125. Id. § 2635.102(g).
126. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 18.
127. Id.
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iture.128 Smaller numbers of employees resigned from outside posi-
tions, and 117 full-time employees received § 208 waivers.129
Importantly, disciplinary and corrective actions are ultimately 
the province of an employee’s own agency rather than OGE or 
some other independent body. OGE’s regulations provide: “It is 
the responsibility of the employing agency to initiate appropriate 
disciplinary or corrective action in individual cases. However, cor-
rective action may be ordered or disciplinary action recommended 
by the Director of the Office of Government Ethics. . . .”130 So, the 
more severe measure of “disciplinary action” can only be recom-
mended by OGE, with the final decision made by the employing 
agency. And at most, OGE can “order” the lesser corrective action, 
but that action is ultimately implemented by the employing agen-
cy.
The applicable regulations also limit OGE’s own consideration 
of potential violations.131 They provide that OGE’s “Director may 
make such recommendations and provide such advice to employ-
ees or agencies as the Director deems necessary to ensure compli-
ance with applicable government ethics laws and regulations.”132
In multiple places, the regulations contemplate that it will be a 
“rare” case that an agency will fail to take action against an em-
ployee after OGE notifies the agency of possible misconduct.133
Nonetheless, the regulations establish procedures when OGE “de-
termines . . . that an agency head has not conducted an investiga-
tion within a reasonable time” notwithstanding OGE’s recommen-
dation that the agency conduct an investigation.134 But ultimately, 
OGE’s actions are limited to (1) issuing “a nonbinding recom-
mendation that appropriate disciplinary or corrective action be 
taken against the employee;”135 (2) issuing “an order directing the 
employee to take specific action to terminate the violation, provid-
ed that the employee has been afforded [notice] and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing” before an administrative judge;136 and (3) no-
tifying the President of the issue.137
These alternative procedures are rarely used and exist more as a 
theoretical safeguard when OGE determines that an agency has 
128. Id.
129. Id. at 18–19.
130. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.106(b) (2018).
131. Id. §§ 2638.501–504.
132. Id. § 2638.503.
133. Id. §§ 2638.501, 2638.504.
134. Id. § 2638.504(a).
135. Id. § 2638.504(e)(2).
136. Id. § 2638.504(e)(3), (f), (g).
137. Id. § 2638.504(a), (e)(2).
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conspicuously failed to take proper action against one of its em-
ployees.138 Among other things, the process is only possible when 
OGE has notice of a potential violation.139 An agency head who re-
fuses to take disciplinary or corrective action may also be unlikely 
to inform OGE of employee misbehavior.
The regulations also specify that OGE does not have the authori-
ty “to make a finding” as to whether a criminal law has been violat-
ed.140 This prohibition extends even to criminal statutes such as the 
financial conflict-of-interest laws that empower OGE to issue im-
plementing regulations.141 Rather, if OGE’s “Director has infor-
mation regarding the violation of a criminal law by an individual 
employee, the Director will notify an Inspector General or the De-
partment of Justice.”142
Nor, among the numerous guidance documents it has issued to 
federal agencies, has OGE provided express recommendations on 
what measures are warranted to address any types of violations.
There is no official—or even publicly available unofficial—
equivalent of sentencing guidelines for disciplinary or corrective 
measures.143
Agency ethics officials likewise cannot normally impose disci-
pline themselves. Rather, they make recommendations to other 
senior officials who have the final word on what action to take 
against an employee. This division of power is borne out in the 
regulations that govern DAEOs.144 The regulations specify a host of 
responsibilities for an agency DAEO, but none authorize the 
DAEO or other ethics officials to make a final disciplinary decision.
Rather, the DAEO is charged with “[a]ssisting the agency in its en-
forcement of ethics laws and regulations when agency officials . . .
[t]ake disciplinary or corrective action.”145
Similarly, agency inspectors general cannot impose disciplinary
measures or take other action against employees who violate ethics 
138. See id. § 2638.504 (providing that “[i]n the rare case” that OGE’s consultation with 
agency ethics offices or individual officials do not resolve an issue, OGE itself may initiate 
proceedings). OGE’s own description of the organizational structure of the executive 
branch ethics program explains that potential violations “are primarily investigated by the 
thousands of Inspectors General staff members across the executive branch.” U.S. OFF. OF 
GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 66, at 2.
139. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.501 (2018).
140. Id. § 2638.502.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 208; see also supra Section I.A.
142. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.502 (2018).
143. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 6 (listing the authority of inspectors general).
144. See 5 C.F.R. § 2638.104(c) (2018).
145. Id. § 2638.104(c)(9)(ii) (emphasis added).
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rules and laws. Inspectors general can, of course, “conduct, super-
vise, and coordinate audits and investigations relating to the pro-
grams and operations” of their respective agencies.146 And unlike
OGE and agency ethics officials, inspectors general have subpoena 
power and the power to take sworn testimony.147 But inspectors 
general do not themselves carry out enforcement of violations.
They cannot require disciplinary action against any federal em-
ployee.148 And with regard to the “prosecution of participants in . . .
fraud or abuse,” all they can ultimately do is “report expeditiously 
to the Attorney General whenever the Inspector General has rea-
sonable grounds to believe there has been a violation of Federal 
criminal law.”149
B. The (In)Frequency of Employee Discipline
In 2018, federal agencies reported 1,077 “disciplinary actions”
based in part or in whole on violations of OGE’s “Standards of 
Conduct” regulations.150 This figure was lower than any prior an-
nual number since OGE began compiling statistics. In fact, the 
number of disciplinary actions dropped every year from 2011 to 
2018. A chart of available numbers shows a steady pattern of de-
cline:151
146. 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(a)(1).
147. Id. § 6(a)(4), (5).
148. See id. § 6.
149. Id. § 4(d).
150. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 26. “Disciplinary action” was defined 
for this purpose as “removals, demotions, suspensions, and written reprimands or their 
equivalents.” Id.
151. Id.; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 62, at 33; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS,
CY16 ANNUAL AGENCY ETHICS PROGRAM QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS: A SUMMARY OF THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS PROGRAM 23 (2017), https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf
/accessdocs_summary-reports (click “Summary Report (CY16) (PDF)”) [https://perma.cc
/PV8F-9K64]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, CY15 ANNUAL AGENCY ETHICS PROGRAM 
QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS: A SNAPSHOT VIEW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS PROGRAM 23 
(2016), https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf/accessdocs_summary-reports (click “Summary 
Report (CY15) (PDF)”) [https://perma.cc/T9QZ-5WCQ]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, CY14
ANNUAL AGENCY ETHICS PROGRAM QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS: A SNAPSHOT VIEW OF THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS PROGRAM 6, 23 (2015), https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf
/accessdocs_summary-reports (click “Summary Report (CY14) (PDF)”) [https://perma.cc
/F2YV-THPK]. In addition, for 2013, OGE published a “Highlights” document that included 
a chart that did not provide exact numbers but showed larger numbers of disciplinary ac-
tions in every year from 2004-2013, including more than 3,500 in each of 2006 and 2009. 
U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS PROGRAM ANNUAL AGENCY 
QUESTIONNAIRE: HIGHLIGHTS CY 2013 5 (2014), https://www2.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf
/Resources/Annual+Agency+Questionnaire+%E2%80%93+Highlights+(CY+2013) (click on 
“link to PDF version”) [https://perma.cc/Y9Q8-YW4Z].
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FEDERAL EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, 2013–2018
Of the disciplinary actions taken in 2018, by far the most com-
mon basis, comprising fifty-eight percent of the instances, was the 
“misuse of position” rule.152 As discussed in Section I.B, that rule 
can encompass such misdeeds as using public office for private 
gain, use of nonpublic information, improper use of government 
property, and misuse of official time.153 Many of these actions may 
simply have involved people not working when they should have 
been. For example, in 2016, the Patent and Trademark Office ex-
perienced a serious scandal involving time and attendance fraud by 
patent examiners.154
The second most common rule cited in disciplinary actions, 
comprising thirty-two percent of actions, was subpart A of 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635.155 This subpart includes the fourteen “general principles”
of ethics that apply to government employees, and OGE’s survey of 
agencies did not get more granular as to which particular princi-
ples were allegedly violated by the disciplined employees.
Because nearly ninety percent of disciplinary actions were based 
on these two broad-based rules, the “misuse of position” rule and 
the “general principles,” it is hard to ascertain exactly what the 
most common type of sanctioned violation was. It is likely that 
many of these disciplinary actions involved general misconduct of 
the kind that could lead to discipline at any private or public 
152. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 26.
153. 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.701–05 (2018).
154. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 14-0990,
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: ANALYSIS OF PATENT 
EXAMINERS’ TIME AND ATTENDANCE (2016), https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/14-
0990.pdf [https://perma.cc/BP2C-AS4A].
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workplace—for example, not showing up for work, mistreating col-
leagues, or misusing the employer’s property—rather than viola-
tions of the standards that apply uniquely to federal employees.
The third most commonly cited basis for discipline of federal 
employees was the restriction on outside activities.156 In contrast
with disciplinary actions based on the two above-mentioned rules,
disciplinary actions based on the rules restricting gifts, financial 
conflicts of interest, the appearance of impropriety, or seeking 
other employment were few and far between.157 For example, there 
were twenty-three disciplinary actions based on outside gifts and 
nineteen based on financial conflicts.158
In addition, there were eighteen disciplinary actions taken for 
violations of the criminal financial conflict statute, 18 U.S.C. § 208, 
as opposed to the financial conflict regulations.159 Zero disciplinary 
actions were taken for violations of any other criminal ethics provi-
sion.160
Agencies’ own reports of the time that ethics officials spent on 
enforcement confirm that it is a small part of their duties. OGE’s
2017 agency ethics offices survey asked agencies to rate, on a scale 
of one to five, how much time they spend on various functions.
Out of 136 responding agencies, exactly one said that the time 
spent on the “[d]isciplinary process for violations” rated a five.161
By contrast, fifty-seven agencies gave a five to “[a]dvice and coun-
seling” and twenty-seven agencies rated a five for both the 
“[c]onfidential financial disclosure program” and the “[p]ublic fi-
nancial disclosure program.”162
C. Ethics Pledge (Non-)Enforcement
For all the public attention they have received, presidential eth-
ics pledges have proven a paper tiger when it comes to enforce-
ment. The Obama and Trump ethics pledges included similar, lim-
ited enforcement mechanisms. First, anyone found to have violated 
their pledge could, after notice and hearing, be barred from lobby-
ing their former agency for five years.163 (Such lobbying was pro-
156. Id.; 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.801–09 (2018).




161. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 62, at 12.
162. Id.
163. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 § 5(b) (Jan. 21, 2009); Exec. Order No. 
13,770, 82 Fed. Reg. 9333 § 5(b) (Feb. 3, 2017).
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hibited anyway by the Trump pledge.164) Second, the pledges em-
powered the DOJ to initiate a civil action against the violator in 
which the government could seek (1) injunctive relief to prevent 
further violations, and (2) “establishment of a constructive trust for 
the benefit of the United States” that required the offending offi-
cial to disgorge whatever income the official earned through the 
violation of his pledge obligations.165
As of this writing, the grand total of enforcement actions of any 
kind taken against violators of either the Obama or Trump ethics 
pledges is zero.166 There have been no actions to bar a former offi-
cial from lobbying his or her former agency for five years and no 
civil actions seeking injunctive relief or a constructive trust.167 In 
any event, the penalty for violating the ethics pledge would be, at 
most, disgorgement of the profits the employee earned by breach-
ing the pledge. So, other than reputational harm, the worst out-
come from a breach would, financially, be a net neutral.168
Some critics of the Trump administration have argued that cer-
tain officials violated the Trump pledge. For example, Citizens for 
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington argues that then-White 
House advisor Steve Bannon, by communicating with his former 
employer Breitbart News Network about its coverage of the admin-
istration, violated the two-year ban on participating in “particular 
matters involving specific parties” where his former employer was a 
party.169 On another occasion, Democratic Senator Sheldon 
Whitehouse suggested that EPA Assistant Administrator Bill 
Wehrum, a former “energy industry lawyer,” violated the pledge by 
164. Exec. Order No. 13,770, 82 Fed. Reg. 9333 § 1(1) (Jan. 28, 2017). As discussed 
above, President Trump rescinded this requirement on his last day in office.
165. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 § 5(c)–(d) (Jan. 21, 2009); Exec. Order 
No. 13,770, 82 Fed. Reg. 9333 § 5(c)–(d) (Jan. 28, 2017).
166. See, e.g., Dealing with Trump Administration Appointees? Watch Out for These Major New 
Restrictions in the “Drain the Swamp” Executive Order, COVINGTON ALERT (Jan. 31, 2017), https:
//www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2017/01/dealing_with_trump_
administration_appointees_watch_out_for_these_major_new_restrictions.pdf (“As far as we 
know, there were no enforcement actions brought against alleged violators of the Obama 
Ethics Pledge. Whether that will be the case in the Trump Administration remains to be 
seen.”).
167. See id.
168. The official would presumably also incur attorneys’ fees in connection with the liti-
gation.
169. Letter from Noah Bookbinder, Exec. Dir., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in 
Washington, to Donald F. McGahn, White House Couns. (Mar. 30, 2017), https:
//www.citizensforethics.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy/2017/03/McGahn-Bannon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BMM7-KQFU]; see also Lachlan Markay, Bannon May Have Violated Ethics 
Pledge by Communicating with Breitbart, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 10, 2017, 2:01 PM), https:
//www.thedailybeast.com/bannon-may-have-violated-ethics-pledge-by-communicating-with-
breitbart [https://perma.cc/K8B6-DYC4]. If CREW’s analysis was correct, Bannon’s actions 
would also have violated the appearance-of-propriety regulation. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 
(2018).
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meeting with various former clients in his official capacity.170 No ac-
tion was taken against Bannon or Wehrum.171
D. Criminal and Civil Enforcement
The “nuclear option” when an ethics law has been violated is a 
criminal prosecution or a civil enforcement action by the DOJ. The 
potential penalties under most of the ethics statutes, including the 
revolving door, financial conflict of interest, and supplementation 
of income statutes, depend on whether the offense was “willful.”
Willful offenses can carry penalties up to five years, while non-
willful offenses are limited to up to one year of imprisonment.172
Fines are available in either instance, and civil actions for penalties 
up to $50,000 are also possible.173 Finally, reporting willfully false 
information in a financial disclosure form can lead to up to one 
year of imprisonment, and willfully filing false reports, or willfully 
failing to file a report at all, can also lead to civil fines.174
Federal law nominally requires executive branch agencies to re-
port any violations of criminal law by agency employees to the DOJ:
Any information, allegation, matter, or complaint wit-
nessed, discovered, or received in a department or agency 
of the executive branch of the Government relating to vio-
lations of Federal criminal law involving Government offic-
ers and employees shall be expeditiously reported to the At-
torney General by the head of the department or 
agency. . . .175
Federal ethics regulations also nominally require OGE to notify the 
DOJ or an inspector general “[i]f the Director has information re-
170. Press Release, Off. of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Whitehouse Calls Out Wehrum for 
Flaunting Trump Ethics Pledge (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news
/release/whitehouse-calls-out-wehrum-for-flaunting-trump-ethics-pledge [https://perma.cc
/L975-L5S2].
171. Press Release, Off. of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Senators Question Steve Bannon, 
White House Ethics Official on Violations of Trump Ethics Pledge (Apr. 20, 2017), https:
//www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/senators-question-steve-bannon-white-house-
ethics-official-on-violations-of-trump-ethics-pledge [https://perma.cc/M6YQ-KYBH]; Derek 
Kravitz, The Trump Administration Says It Has Violated Its Own Ethics Pledge, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 
23, 2019), https://www.govexec.com/management/2019/10/trump-administration-says-it-
has-violated-its-own-ethics-pledge/160814 [https://perma.cc/39GR-9X8C].
172. 18 U.S.C. § 216(a).
173. Id. § 216(a), (b).
174. 5 U.S.C. app. § 104(a)(2).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b).
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garding the violation of a criminal law by an individual employ-
ee. . . .”176
It is uncommon for ethics officials to make criminal referrals,
and most referrals that do happen do not result in prosecution.
(The latter fact may well be a cause of the former.) In 2018, federal 
agencies made fifty-six referrals to the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
for potential violations of the ethics laws.177 Of those, three were 
accepted for prosecution.178 The previous year, agencies made six-
ty-nine referrals to the DOJ, of which nine were accepted for pros-
ecution.179 Anecdotally, agency lawyers who have worked on refer-
rals will say that DOJ will decline to prosecute in all but the most 
clear-cut cases involving the most egregious actions.
OGE annually surveys and compiles information on prosecu-
tions and civil enforcement actions involving ethics statutes.180
These surveys indicate that prosecutions are few and far between, 
given the millions of federal employees who are subject to these 
laws.
By far the most common type of enforcement action was based 
on a failure of financial reporting. As discussed above, the report-
ing statute itself provides criminal penalties for “knowingly and 
willfully” reporting false or incomplete information.181 DOJ, how-
ever, virtually never prosecutes a person criminally under this stat-
ute. Rather, prosecutions for reporting violations are brought un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which generally prohibits false statements to 
the government and carries more severe penalties than the finan-
cial reporting statute.182 From 2017 through 2019, the DOJ charged 
eight government officials under this statute based on reporting 
violations in their financial disclosures. The examples are instruc-
tive:
• In the most high-profile case, Corrine Brown, a longtime 
member of Congress, was alleged to have participated in a 
“conspiracy and fraud scheme” in which she and others so-
licited donations for an educational charity with the false 
176. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.502 (2018).
177. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 27.
178. Id.
179. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 62, at 34.
180. See Conflict of Interest Prosecution Surveys, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICs, 
https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest+Prosecution+Surveys
(last visited Jan. 7, 2020).
181. 5 U.S.C. app. § 104(a)(2).
182. The maximum prison sentence under the financial disclosure statute is one year, 
while the penalty for violation of § 1001 is up to five years. 5 U.S.C. app. § 104(a)(2)(B)(i);
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). The penalty under § 1001 can be up to eight years if the offense in-
volves terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
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representation that the money would be used “for college 
scholarships and school computer drives, among other 
causes.” In fact, more than $300,000 of the money was used 
to hold events hosted by or honoring the Congresswoman.
Brown was charged with numerous counts of conspiracy, 
mail fraud, wire fraud, concealment, and filing false tax re-
turns, as well as failure to report income on her annual fi-
nancial disclosure statement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1001. The case went to trial and she was convicted on 
eighteen counts, including § 1001. She was sentenced to 
five years imprisonment, plus restitution of $515,166.86 
and ordered to forfeit $664,292.39. The conviction was 
upheld on appeal.183
• An official in the Public Health Services/Indian Health 
Services section of the Department of Health and Human 
Services pleaded guilty to one count of violating § 1001 for 
failing to disclose a $5,000 check she had received from an 
Indian Health Services doctor. The doctor had been ac-
cused by multiple people of sexually abusing minors, and 
the official was allegedly aware of the accusations. She was 
sentenced to twelve months unsupervised probation.184
• A Securities and Exchange Commission employee failed to 
disclose various options transactions he had made and the 
gains from those trades. His failure to report these transac-
tions violated not only federal financial reporting rules but 
also additional reporting and conflict rules that applied to 
SEC employees in particular. Both the DOJ and the SEC 
brought actions against him. In the criminal action, he 
pleaded guilty to violating one count of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
He was sentenced to twelve months’ probation including 
six months of home confinement, and fines and special as-
sessments totaling $1,100. In the SEC action, he was or-
dered to pay restitution, civil penalties, and interest total-
ing just under $110,000.185
• A federal employee in Washington, D.C., was implicated in 
a conspiracy to defraud a mortgage lender of $337,000. He 
faced charges under various federal statutes and eventually 
183. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-18-09, 2017 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION 
SURVEY 9–10 (2018), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2017 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”)
[https://perma.cc/B5TX-4VA3] [hereinafter 2017 CONFLICT SURVEY]; United States v. 
Brown, 947 F.3d 655 (11th Cir. 2020).
184. 2017 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 183, at 6–7.
185. Id. at 7–8.
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pleaded guilty to charges of bank fraud, aiding and abet-
ting, and false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
He was sentenced to imprisonment for twelve months and 
one day and required to pay restitution.186
• A contracting officer with the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention received payments from a company that 
was seeking to do business with the agency, and the officer 
approved a single-source contract. The officer also failed to 
report any outside income on his annual financial disclo-
sure statement. He pleaded guilty to two counts of violat-
ing § 1001 and was sentenced to three months imprison-
ment and other penalties.187
• A safety inspector with the Federal Aviation Administration
received over $15,000 in payments from an avionics com-
pany in return for tipping it off in advance of FAA inspec-
tions, providing confidential information on competitors, 
and failing to report the company’s legal violations. The 
inspector also failed to report those payments on his finan-
cial disclosure forms. A jury found him guilty of bribery, 
false statements, and various other charges. He was sen-
tenced to 75 months imprisonment and ordered to pay 
fines, restitution, and special assessments totaling over 
$160,000.188
• A contract specialist with the Department of State received 
more than $500,000 in cash from the owner of a Turkish 
construction firm in exchange for favorable contracting 
decisions. He failed to report those payments on his finan-
cial disclosure forms. A jury found him guilty of bribery 
and false statements, and he was sentenced to 87 months 
imprisonment plus financial penalties.189
• A civilian employee with the U.S. Navy Public Works De-
partment gave various types of favorable treatment to Navy 
vendors in exchange for more than $850,000 in kickbacks. 
He failed to report those payments on his financial disclo-
sure forms. He was charged with bribery, violating 18
186. Id. at 8–9.
187. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-19-05, 2018 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION 
SURVEY 9–10 (2019), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2018 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://
perma.cc/8LKS-S9XB] [hereinafter 2018 CONFLICT SURVEY].
188. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-20-05, 2019 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION 
SURVEY 1–2 (2020), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2019 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://
perma.cc/D3Y4-EPPR] [hereinafter 2019 CONFLICT SURVEY].
189. Id. at 2–3.
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U.S.C. § 1001, and various other charges, and pleaded 
guilty to conspiracy and tax charges. He was sentenced to 
70 months imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution of 
over $1 million.190
These eight prosecutions have in common that none of them 
involved simply a willful failure to accurately report financial hold-
ings or income. Rather, they all evinced a broader pattern of crim-
inality or corruption. Congresswoman Brown and the D.C. em-
ployee were implicated in large-scale fraudulent conspiracies, and 
the financial reporting charge was just one of many they faced.
The public health official, the charges strongly suggested, was 
bribed to look the other way by a doctor facing multiple abuse al-
legations. The SEC employee engaged in what was likely suspected 
to be insider trading. And the CDC, FAA, and State Department
officials were, either explicitly or in essence, accused of bribery. In 
each case, the financial reporting violation was incidental to the 
larger offense.
The other 2017, 2018, and 2019 prosecutions and civil actions 
against government officials based on government ethics statutes 
involved a similar pattern:
• A Navy official was accused of conspiring with a contractor 
to steer government contracts to it and received $86,000, 
funneled through two other companies, for doing so. He 
was charged with receiving an illegal gratuity under the 
bribery and gratuity statute, a conflict of interest in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 208, and wire fraud conspiracy. He 
pleaded guilty to the wire fraud charge and was sentenced 
to three years imprisonment, supervised release, and $1 
million in restitution.191
• A contracting officer for the Department of Agriculture 
awarded a $22,500 contract to a company of which his wife 
was a part owner. He pleaded guilty to violating § 208 and 
was sentenced to three years’ probation and a $10,000 fi-
ne.192
• An engineer for a Navy maintenance center attempted to 
conceal a financial relationship with a defense contractor 
whose subcontracts he was involved in administering. He 
190. Id. at 3.
191. 2017 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 183, at 3–4.
192. Id. at 4–5.
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pleaded guilty to violating § 208 and was sentenced to 
three years’ probation and a $10,000 fine.193
• A Bureau of Prisons employee was accused of acting as a 
paid “consultant” to a company that paid him in exchange 
for favorable treatment in the contracting process, includ-
ing providing the company with nonpublic information 
that helped it in the bidding process. The employee was 
accused of violating 18 U.S.C. § 209, the supplementation-
of-income statute, as well as various other statutes relating 
to fraud and contracting practices. He entered into a civil 
settlement with the DOJ in which he agreed to pay 
$50,000.194
• A civilian employee of the Army was responsible for over-
seeing the performance of a contract for hazardous waste 
and materials management, while simultaneously acting as 
an employee of the contractor itself. She was charged with 
violating both 18 U.S.C. § 208 and 18 U.S.C. § 203, one of 
the “representational” statutes, and pleaded guilty to the 
latter charge. She was sentenced to probation and 
$354,499 in restitution.195
• A special agent with Immigrations and Customs Enforce-
ment was accused of using his position to facilitate the en-
try of an inadmissible alien and of accepting financial ben-
efits from the alien for doing so. He was charged with an 
array of offenses, including the “representational” statute 
18 U.S.C. § 205. At trial he was convicted on multiple 
counts and was sentenced to one year and one day in pris-
on.196
• An employee of the United States Postal Service was in-
volved in awarding a power washing contract to a company 
owned by her husband. She pleaded guilty to violating 18 
U.S.C. § 208 and was sentenced to probation and a fine.197
• A civilian Defense Department employee was involved in 
decisions affecting the finances of an information technol-
ogy company owned by her husband, which was a depart-
mental subcontractor. She pleaded guilty to violating 18 
U.S.C. § 208 and was sentenced to probation and a fine.198
193. Id. at 5–6.
194. Id. at 6. The company and its owner also agreed to pay a settlement of $2,475,000.
195. 2018 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 187, at 1–2.
196. Id. at 2–3.
197. Id. at 4–5.
198. Id. at 5–6.
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• An oceanographer with the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 209, the supplementation-of-income statute, for receiving 
payments from a Chinese university and using his position 
at NOAA to benefit the university’s students.199
• An employee of the Food and Drug Administration helped 
a company get selected as a vendor for building mainte-
nance and janitorial work in exchange for payments and 
various other benefits. He was charged with, inter alia,
bribery and violation of 18 U.S.C. § 208 and pleaded guilty 
to a § 208 violation. He was sentenced to probation.200
• The head of a post office in Scotland County, North Caro-
lina awarded a cleaning services contract to her husband. 
She pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 208 and was sen-
tenced to probation.201
• An Air Force official simultaneously served as a paid con-
sultant for an aviation company and recommended that 
company as a subcontractor on a contract he oversaw. He 
pleaded guilty to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 208 
and was sentenced to home confinement, probation, and 
restitution.202
• A U.S. Navy captain secretly provided paid public relations 
services to Malaysian defense contractor Leonard Francis, 
including advising Francis on his dealings with Navy offi-
cials. As part of the Navy’s much larger “Fat Leonard”
scandal, the captain pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §
208 and was sentenced to six months imprisonment and 
other penalties.203
• A field examiner with the Department of Veterans Affairs 
was assigned to assist a veteran in drafting a will and de-
ceived the veteran into designating the examiner as the 
sole beneficiary of the accounts in the estate, worth over 
$680,000. The examiner was charged with an array of viola-
tions, including 18 U.S.C. § 208. A jury found him guilty 
199. Id. at 7.
200. 2019 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 188, at 4.
201. Id. at 6.
202. Id. at 6–7.
203. Id. at 7–8; see also Geoff Ziezulewicz, Navy Captain Who Moonlighted as Fat Leonard’s
PR Man Is Going to Prison, NAVY TIMES (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.navytimes.com/news
/your-navy/2019/02/09/navy-captain-who-moonlighted-as-fat-leonards-pr-man-is-headed-to-
prison [https://perma.cc/8A3J-XC4E].
WINTER 2021] Government Ethics in the Age of Trump 367
on all counts, and the court sentenced him to eight years 
imprisonment.204
Except for the last case, all of these cases amounted to accusa-
tions that an official was improperly favoring a company or indi-
vidual to which the official had secret ties. In substance, these were 
likely bribery cases where the government could not quite prove 
the elements required under the bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, 
or the defendant was able to plead down to a lesser charge. Again, 
as with the financial-reporting violations, the financial conflict or 
supplementation-of-income charge was incidental to what was per-
ceived as more serious wrongdoing. It may be going too far to de-
scribe the ethics statutes violations as afterthoughts, but they were 
plainly fallbacks and add-ons. They were the equivalent of Al Ca-
pone being prosecuted for tax evasion.
As with the 2017 and 2018 prosecutions discussed above, earlier 
prosecutions under the financial conflict of interest statute, § 208, 
focused on instances where the federal official did not merely have 
a financial interest in a matter under their authority but clearly 
abused that authority to give advantages to the financial interest.
For example:
• A supervisor with the District of Columbia Water and Sew-
age Authority controlled a company that was paid to help 
applicants seeking permits from DC Water; he then, in his 
capacity as supervisor, approved and issued those permits 
to his clients. He was sentenced to twelve months’ proba-
tion.205
• An assistant at the VA Medical Center requested that the 
Medical Center purchase an antimicrobial dressing manu-
factured by a company that had offered her a job, and 
whose distributor had paid her for consulting services, 
even after receiving an ethics opinion advising her to recu-
se herself from such matters. She was convicted at trial and 
sentenced to one year’s probation, including three months 
of home confinement.206
• A Lieutenant Colonel and spinal surgeon for the U.S. Ar-
my was involved in a laundering and kickback scheme to 
204. 2018 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 187, at 6.
205. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-17-08, 2016 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION 
SURVEY, at 3–4 (2017), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2016 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://
perma.cc/XW5G-3LX9] [hereinafter 2016 CONFLICT SURVEY].
206. Id. at 4–5.
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cause army hospitals to purchase surgical tools and spinal 
implants from a company that was secretly paying him. He 
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 months imprison-
ment, another year of supervised release, and a $15,000 fi-
ne.207
• A postmaster in Wisconsin awarded contracts to a cleaning 
business of which he was a part owner. He was sentenced 
to one year’s probation and also agreed to pay $50,000 in a 
separate civil settlement.208
• A civilian employee of the United States Army Research 
Laboratories arranged to award contract business to a 
company in which he and his wife were secretly involved.
He was sentenced to forty-two months imprisonment and 
three years of supervised release. He was also ordered to 
pay $750,000 in restitution.209
In all of these § 208 prosecutions, the offender did not merely 
“participate personally and substantially” in a matter in which he 
or she “has a financial interest.”210 Rather, in each case, the official 
affirmatively steered business to or otherwise helped a company in 
which he or she had an interest. In most cases, the officials’ con-
nection to the business in question was deliberately concealed. In 
none of these cases was the effect of the official’s participation in 
the matter neutral or negative as to the affected financial interest.
The financial conflict statute plainly prohibits personal and sub-
stantial participation in a matter likely to affect a financial interest, 
even if the official’s participation does not actually benefit the fi-
nancial interest. As discussed above, although the number of exec-
utive branch officials who are disciplined for violating the financial 
conflict law is not particularly large, it dwarfs the number who are 
criminally prosecuted.211 The lack of prosecution in such instances 
raises the question whether the broader prohibition in the statute 
is, as a practical matter, extraneous, when the only offenses that 
lead to prosecution are those in which the official actually pursues 
financial benefit for his or her interests. DOJ effectively treats the 
statute as one prohibiting abuse of one’s government position for 
207. Id. at 6–7.
208. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-16-05, 2015 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION 
SURVEY, at 5–6 (2016), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2015 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://
perma.cc/S3A9-4L8E] [hereinafter 2015 CONFLICT SURVEY].
209. Id. at 6–7.
210. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a).
211. See supra Section III.B.
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private gain, rather than the broader prohibition of conflicts of in-
terest.
DOJ’s treatment of these cases suggests a recognition of a dis-
tinction between the appearance of impropriety and actual impro-
priety. Section 208 is designed not just to punish officials who use 
their office for private gain, but also to avoid the decay of trust in 
government that can result if officials are even allowed to be in a 
position to potentially realize such gain.
2017, 2018, and 2019 were fairly typical years for ethics-law-based 
prosecutions. An overall review of government ethics-related pros-
ecutions and civil enforcement actions in the past decade is in-
structive. The chart below lists the number of prosecutions and civ-
il enforcement actions based on OGE’s survey from 2010 through 
2019:212
Offense Total reported enforcement ac-
tions, 2009–18
18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205 (acting as rep-
resentative before government)
6
18 U.S.C. § 207 (revolving door stat-
ute)
9
18 U.S.C. § 208 (financial conflicts) 52
18 U.S.C. § 209 (supplementation of 
income)
9
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (or 1018) (false re-
porting)
25
5 U.S.C. app. 4, § 104 (financial dis-
closure)
3
212. 2019 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 188; 2018 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 187; 2017
CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 183; 2016 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 205; 2015 CONFLICT 
SURVEY, supra note 208; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-15-10, 2014 CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
PROSECUTION SURVEY (2015), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of
+Interest+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2014 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https:
//perma.cc/N25X-S7DG] [hereinafter 2014 CONFLICT SURVEY]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS,
LA-14-07, 2013 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION SURVEY (2014), https://www.oge.gov
/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2013 Conflict of 
Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://perma.cc/QS67-U84T] [hereinafter 2013 CONFLICT 
SURVEY]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS. LA-13-12, 2012 CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROSECUTION 
SURVEY (2013), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict+of+Interest
+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2012 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”) [https://
perma.cc/HL69-DHV8]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-12-06, 2011 CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
PROSECUTION SURVEY (2012), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/Conflict
+of+Interest+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2011 Conflict of Interest Prosecution Survey”)
[https://perma.cc/Y8AV-HY22]; U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, LA-11-08, 2010 CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST PROSECUTION SURVEY (2011), https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources
/Conflict+of+Interest+Prosecution+Surveys (click “2010 Conflict of Interest Prosecution 
Survey”) [https://perma.cc/6FBM-73RR] [hereinafter 2010 CONFLICT SURVEY].
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A total of 103 individuals, out of a federal workforce of over two 
million, were subject to criminal or civil enforcement actions dur-
ing this ten-year period.213 The total number of actions stayed fairly 
consistent from year to year, with no year during this decade-long 
period having more than thirteen actions or fewer than seven.214
The most common actions were for financial conflicts of interest 
and for violations of the false reporting statutes based on financial 
disclosures.
During this period the DOJ invoked the financial reporting stat-
ute in just three reported cases, as it generally preferred to prose-
cute financial reporting violations under the general false-
statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (or § 1018).215 In all three cas-
es, the offense in question was not a false filing, but rather a willful 
failure to file a required report.216 And all three cases were civil ac-
tions rather than criminal: In this ten-year period, the federal gov-
ernment brought no criminal charges under the financial disclo-
sure statute.217 Two of the three civil cases were settlements in 
which the offender failed to file a termination report after leaving 
government.218 The defendants were fined $1,000 and $4,000, re-
spectively.219
The one fully litigated action under the financial disclosure law 
was against an employee of Congress rather than the Executive 
Branch. The employee, a former chief of staff for a member of 
Congress, also refused to file a termination report when he left 
Congress.220 He failed to respond to DOJ’s civil complaint against 
him, and the court eventually entered judgment against him, re-
quiring him to pay a $25,000 penalty.221 And in 2019, the DOJ
brought a civil action against a former White House official who 
failed to file a termination report: onetime Apprentice contestant 
Omarosa Manigault Newman.222
213. See sources cited supra note 212; Historical Federal Workforce Tables: Executive Branch 
Civilian Employment Since 1940, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-
analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/historical-tables/executive-branch-
civilian-employment-since-1940/ [https://perma.cc/QHK8-NVNE] (last visited Dec. 28, 
2020).
214. See 2013 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 212 (reporting thirteen new prosecutions for 
violations of ethics statutes or for false financial disclosures); 2010 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra
note 212 (reporting seven new such prosecutions).
215. 2015 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 208; 2014 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 212.
216. See sources cited supra note 212.
217. See sources cited supra note 212.
218. 2015 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 208, at 11–12.
219. Id.
220. 2014 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 212, at 8–9.
221. Id.
222. Complaint at ¶ 1, United States v. Manigault Newman, No. 19-CV-01868 (D.D.C. 
June 25, 2019).
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The relative lack of priority given to the criminal government 
ethics statutes is also evident in the DOJ’s written guidance for 
prosecutors. DOJ’s Justice Manual (formerly called the United 
States Attorneys’ Manual) is a comprehensive document that con-
tains “publicly available [DOJ] policies and procedures.”223 It pro-
vides guidance on dozens of areas of criminal law, ranging from 
copyright law to money laundering to employee benefit plan kick-
backs.224 The section on “Protection of Government Integrity” dis-
cusses bribery of public officials, interference with federally pro-
tected activities (for example, voter intimidation), campaign 
finance laws, federal patronage crimes, election corruption, and 
purchase and sale of public office.225 This section says nothing 
about the financial conflict of interest law, the revolving door stat-
ute, or the other government ethics statutes.
DOJ’s even more extensive Criminal Resource Manual provides 
prosecutors with summaries and guidance on hundreds of federal 
criminal laws.226 Seven sections of the Criminal Resource Manual 
deal with the federal bribery and gratuity statute.227 Zero sections 
deal with other government ethics statutes.
E. Why So Little Enforcement?
There are at least three ways to interpret the disconnect between 
the large regulatory apparatus of ethics compliance and the dearth 
of active enforcement of these laws. The first is to conclude that 
the system is working as intended: because many regulators are on 
the job, providing guidance and policing employees, the number 
of actual violations requiring disciplinary action or more severe 
sanctions is relatively minimal. The second possible conclusion is 
that the system is, in fact, overregulated: with so few apparent viola-
tions, the resources devoted to compliance are far greater than 
necessary, and the system of compliance for things like financial 
disclosure is far too burdensome. And finally, one may conclude 
that we are in the worst of both worlds: Taxpayers fund an army of 
223. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-1.100 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm
/jm-1-1000-introduction [https://perma.cc/8AXK-Z9Q7].
224. Id. tit. 9, https://www.justice.gov/jm/title-9-criminal [https://perma.cc/9XHR-
9B2U].
225. Id. § 9-85.000, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-85000-protection-government-
integrity [https://perma.cc/4X84-ZJ5M].
226. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL (2020), https://www.justice.gov
/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual [https://perma.cc/3APZ-CR38].
227. Id. §§ 2041–47, https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2001-299
[https://perma.cc/P7EN-3VQX].
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ethics officials throughout the federal government, but those offi-
cials fail to pursue more than a handful of violators.
It is impossible to know which one of these conclusions is the 
correct one, or if some combination is at work. Is an ounce of pre-
vention worth a pound of cure, or are there too many cops on the 
beat?
At any rate, there is little reason to believe the few instances of 
enforcement are an indication that ethics violations are uncom-
mon. One study of corporate crime made the epistemological 
point that “official observations are limited to illegal acts recorded 
by enforcement agents and neglect those acts that do not come to 
the attention of authorities.”228 Rather, it is most likely absence of 
evidence rather than evidence of absence: Just because we do not 
know of wrongdoing does not mean that it is not there.
Some comparisons with other agencies’ civil enforcement and 
administrative actions may be an effective comparator:
• The Securities and Exchange Commission filed 490 
standalone enforcement actions in 2018 and 446 in 2017.229
• In fiscal year 2017, the EPA referred 110 civil enforcement 
cases to the DOJ, filed 80 civil complaints in court, and 
filed 1,220 administrative penalty order complaints.230
• In fiscal year 2018, the Federal Election Commission 
closed 167 matters under review.231
• In fiscal year 2017, the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC) brought 49 enforcement actions.232
These numbers all dwarf the number of civil and criminal ac-
tions taken to enforce government ethics laws, even where—as with 
a specialized agency like the CFTC—the universe of regulated par-
ties is much smaller than the federal workforce. In 2017, there 
were approximately 2,675,924 civilian employees in the federal ex-
228. Sally S. Simpson, Carole Gibbs, Melissa Rorie, Lee Ann Slocum, Mark A. Cohen &
Michael Vandenbergh, An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime-Control Strate-
gies, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 234 (2013).
229. SEC, DIV. OF ENF’T, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/files
/enforcement-annual-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LVH2-BDVU].
230. Enforcement Annual Results Numbers at a Glance for Fiscal Year 2017, EPA, https://
archive.epa.gov/epa/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-numbers-glance-fiscal-year-
2017.html [https://perma.cc/D2GH-R9H2] (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).
231. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1977-2018 
(2018), https://transition.fec.gov/em/enfpro/enforcestatsfy1975-2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YF32-JY9N].
232. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Releases Annual En-
forcement Results for Fiscal Year 2017 (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom
/PressReleases/7650-17 [https://perma.cc/4NEV-GBUU].
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ecutive branch.233 Federal ethics regulations and statutes applied to 
nearly all of them. Counting uniformed military personnel, to 
whom the ethics statutes generally apply, the total number of ex-
ecutive branch employees jumps to 4,059,488.234
Counting just the civilian employees, in 2018, fewer than one in 
2,000 employees was disciplined in some way for violating federal 
ethics rules. Of these incidents of discipline, as discussed above, 
most of them likely involved general misconduct of the kind that 
could occur at any workplace, rather than violation of the ethics 
rules specific to the federal government.
A total of 167 disciplinary actions were taken for violation of the 
restrictions on gifts, financial conflicts, impartiality in performing 
official duties, seeking other employment, and outside activities.235
This means that fewer than one in ten thousand civilian employees 
was disciplined in 2018 for violating one of these rules. To put that 
number in perspective, the U.S. Department of State has approxi-
mately 11,000 civil service employees.236 By this metric, exactly one 
of them would have been disciplined in 2018 for one of these viola-
tions.
And of course, formal enforcement actions, in the form of civil 
suits or criminal prosecution, were far rarer.237 In a federal work-
force of more than two million, fewer than one in 200,000 execu-
tive branch officials per year is charged with any civil or criminal 
violation under the government ethics statutes.
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND A 
WAY FORWARD
As shown in Parts I and II, the federal government has an exten-
sive system of ethical standards and a substantial infrastructure of 
compliance-focused officials that imposes considerable costs and 
burdens on the federal workforce. But as Part III demonstrated, 
the consequences for violating these standards are few and far be-
tween.
233. JENNINGS & NAGEL, supra note 7.
234. Id. Enlisted uniformed military personnel are exempt from the general executive 
branch ethics regulations. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.103 (2018).
235. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 95, at 26. The total number of individuals 
disciplined based on violations of these provisions may have been lower because the same 
person may have been found to have violated more than one of them.
236. Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do/mission/
[https://perma.cc/U7RY-UX2W] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
237. See supra Section III.D.
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Ultimately, the federal tilt toward prevention and compliance, 
and away from active enforcement, excessively burdens the officials 
who are most likely to be compliant in any event while it minimizes 
the deterrent effect on potential rule breakers. The officials who 
pay scrupulous attention to bulletins from their agency DAEO, and 
who call their ethics office for guidance on whether they can ac-
cept a particular gift, are not the ones who are likely to get into 
ethics trouble. Rather, it is the employee who flies under the ethi-
cal radar that can create a problem.
This Part first assesses the current low-enforcement model of 
government ethics from the perspective of criminal deterrence 
theory. It then considers and proposes several possible reforms to 
the federal government’s ethics regime to address the inadequate 
deterrence created by the current system.
A. Enforcement and Deterrence
Laws and rules rarely enforced are unlikely to foster compliance.
As discussed in this section, voluminous scholarship on the deter-
rence of crime confirms that when (1) a particular type of crime is 
rarely sanctioned, (2) there is no perception that that type of crime 
is likely to be punished, and (3) any punishment that does happen 
will only occur after a long and protracted process, then (4) deter-
rence is minimized. These factors all work against effective deter-
rence in the government ethics sphere.
1. Deterrence and the Certainty of Punishment
A great irony of the federal government’s sparse enforcement of 
its ethical standards is that the government itself has acknowledged 
that misconduct with a low probability of punishment is unlikely to 
be deterred, even if the potential sanctions are severe. In 2016, the 
DOJ’s National Justice Institute released a publication titled “Five 
Things About Deterrence,” which summarized key research find-
ings on the topic.238 The stated purpose of the publication was “to 
help those who make policies and laws that are based on sci-
ence.”239 Number one on the list stated: “The certainty of being 
caught is a vastly more powerful deterrent than the punishment.
Research shows clearly that the chance of being caught is a vastly 
238. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., FIVE THINGS ABOUT DETERRENCE 1 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/247350.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8T6-2883].
239. Id. at 2.
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more effective deterrent than even draconian punishment.”240 Item 
number three said: “Police deter crime by increasing the percep-
tion that criminals will be caught and punished.”241 A supplemental 
discussion explained that “it is the certainty of being caught that 
deters a person from committing crime, not the fear of being pun-
ished or the severity of the punishment. Effective policing that 
leads to swift and certain (but not necessarily severe) sanctions is a 
better deterrent than the threat of incarceration.”242
Deterrence scholars Daniel Nagin and Greg Pogarsky have simi-
larly concluded: “punishment certainty is far more consistently 
found to deter crime than punishment severity, and the extra-legal 
consequences of crime seem at least as great a deterrent as the le-
gal consequences.”243 Another literature review found that “[t]he 
current research, confirming earlier correlational and quasi-
experimental studies, indicates that there are consistent and signif-
icant negative correlations between likelihood of conviction and 
crime rates.”244 And a summary by Nagin explained that “[t]he per-
ceptual deterrence literature consistently finds that perceived cer-
tainty of punishment is associated with reduced self-reported or in-
tended offending.”245
Another literature review summarized the link between deter-
rence and certainty of punishment as follows: “Deterrence in gen-
eral, whether contextualized as specific or general, depends on an 
offender or would-be offender’s perceptions of sanction threats, 
the probability of apprehension, and the like.”246 And one summary 
of the relevant research concluded: “[I]n reviewing macrolevel 
studies that examine offense rates of a specific population, the re-
searchers found that an increased likelihood (certainty) of appre-
240. Id. at 1.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2.
243. Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanc-
tion Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 865 
(2001).
244. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, ANTHONY BOTTOMS, ELIZABETH BURNEY & P-O WILKSTROM,
CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 47
(1999).
245. Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrent Effects of the Certainty and Severity of Punishment, in 7
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 157, 158 (Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cher-
yl Lero Jonson eds., 2018).
246. Kelli D. Tomlinson, An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?, FED.
PROBATION, Dec. 2016, at 34. But see id. at 35 (“The impact of certainty of punishment for 
criminal acts is just as murky as the research on severity of punishment. Some studies indi-
cate perceived certainty of sanction threats has very little effect on re-offense rates, whereas 
other research claims it does have an effect on some people but not others.” (citations omit-
ted)).
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hension and punishment was associated with declining crime 
rates.”247
Another review specified that when the likelihood of punish-
ment is low, deterrence is virtually nonexistent: “at a 10 per cent 
punishment rate, almost no suppression [of wrongdoing] was ob-
served.”248 Importantly, it is the likelihood of apprehension—
almost regardless of the severity of the legal consequences—that is 
a significant indicator of deterrent effects:
The empirical studies seem to agree that increasing the 
probability of punishment provides a better chance of 
strengthening deterrence than increasing the severity of 
punishment. Establishing some base expectation of a mean-
ingful chance of punishment is a necessary condition to any 
deterrent effect. Yet, we have previously noted just how low 
is the perceived probability of punishment—a perception 
that results from the very low actual rates of punishment, 
and is further exacerbated by the human tendency to heavi-
ly discount a future event.249
For non-violent crimes, research also shows that certainty of ap-
prehension is a significant deterrent:
People who perceive that sanctions are more certain tend 
to be less likely to engage in criminal activity. Scenario-
based research using self-reports that examine the effect of 
certainty of punishment on individual behavior has shown 
that as the perceptions of the risk of arrest for petty theft, 
drunk driving, and tax evasion increases, individuals report 
they would be less likely to offend.250
Similarly, Nagin and Pogarsky surveyed college students to deter-
mine how different factors would affect their willingness to drink 
and drive. They found that a ten percent increase in the likelihood 
of sanction (whether a criminal penalty or a license suspension) 
“reduces subjects’ probability of driving drunk by 3.3 [percent].”251
247. VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENT’G PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 4 (2010) (citing VON HIRSCH ET AL.,
supra note 244).
248. Paul. H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science 
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 183 (2004).
249. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Crimi-
nal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 992–93 (2003).
250. WRIGHT, supra note 247, at 4–5.
251. Nagin & Pogarsky, supra note 243, at 877.
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2. Deterrence and the Speed of Punishment
The lengthy process of criminal prosecution also works against 
deterrence: as one review put it, “a delay between violation and 
punishment can dramatically reduce the perceived cost of the vio-
lation. Even if the punishment is certain, the more distant it is, the 
more its weight as a threat will be discounted.”252 Or, as another 
commentator explained: “Even a greater likelihood of being 
caught will not have much impact in deterring a violation if the 
timing of a prosecution is delayed long enough so that the miscre-
ant discounts the effect of any punishment.”253
The “celerity” of punishment—”the criminogenic consequences 
of how swift a punishment is implemented”254—may also be a sig-
nificant factor in deterrence. Although the evidence is mixed on 
whether celerity is a consistent factor in criminal deterrence,255
substantial amounts of research indicate that in controlled envi-
ronments, it is a significant factor that may be applicable to the 
wider world.256
The problem is that, as scholars of celerity and deterrence put it, 
“implementing celerity of punishment into the criminal justice system in a 
meaningful way is a practical impossibility.”257 This is because “[t]he 
criminal justice system is not built for speed.”258
3. Deterrence and White-Collar Crime
When it comes to white-collar offenses in particular—which gov-
ernment ethics violations can properly be considered259—
252. Robinson & Darley, supra note 249, at 954.
253. Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White-Collar Criminals?, 28 WAYNE 
ST. L. REV. 27, 41 (2015).
254. Travis C. Pratt & Jillian J. Turanovic, Celerity and Deterrence, in 7 ADVANCES IN 
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 245, at 187.
255. See id. at 191.
256. See id. at 191–93.
257. Id. at 193.
258. Id.
259. The FBI describes white-collar crimes as follows:
[T]he term white-collar crime is now synonymous with the full range of frauds 
committed by business and government professionals. These crimes are character-
ized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and are not dependent on the 
application or threat of physical force or violence. The motivation behind these 
crimes is financial—to obtain or avoid losing money, property, or services or to 
secure a personal or business advantage.
White Collar Crime, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime [https://perma.
cc/83FB-3JTK] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). One study of white collar versus other crime de-
fined it as “planned crimes that involve cheating or lying that usually occur in the course of 
employment.” DONALD J. REBOVICH, & JENNY LAYNE, NATIONAL WHITE-COLLAR CRIME CTR.,
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deterrence scholarship reaches the same conclusions.260 As two au-
thors put it: “A wealth of studies suggest, perhaps especially in the 
case of white-collar offenders but also more generally, that it is the 
certainty of punishment, i.e., the certainty of being caught, that de-
ters more than the extent of punishment once caught.”261
This conclusion is bolstered by a meta-analysis of studies on the 
analogous subject of whether internal corporate codes of ethics are 
effective deterrents to wrongdoing. The meta-analysis concluded 
that “individuals agreeing with the statement that their companies 
punish unethical behavior tend to work in companies that commit 
fewer unethical acts.”262 In short, and unsurprisingly, the percep-
tion that unethical acts will be punished matters.
White collar crimes are especially difficult to deter because viola-
tors perceive the odds of getting caught as particularly low. An anal-
ysis of data from the National Public Survey on White-Collar Crime 
conducted in 2000 concluded that “perceptions of sanction cer-
tainty were much higher for robbery (75 percent likely to get 
caught) compared to fraud (22 percent likely to get caught).”263
Moreover, the survey respondents were not uniform across demo-
graphic lines. In particular, the more educated and higher-income 
respondents were less likely than others to believe that the white-
collar criminal would be caught.264 Similarly, a recent environmen-
tal crime survey posited that “[r]egulators may be able to discour-
age offending by publicizing actual cases of noncompliance or be-
yond-compliance behaviors.”265
THE NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 6 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/Digitization/181968NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU9B-FYX3].
260. See generally Natalie Schell-Busey, Sally S. Simpson, Melissa Rorie & Mariel Alper,
What Works? A Systematic Review of Corporate Crime Deterrence, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
387 (2016).
261. Carlton Gunn & Myra Sun, Sometimes the Cure is Worse Than the Disease: The One-Way 
White-Collar Sentencing Ratchet, 38 HUM. RTS. 9, 12 (2011) (citing other literature); see also
L.E. Dervan, White Collar Overcriminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of Inno-
cence, 101 KY. L.J. 723, 739–40 (2013) (discussing certainty of punishment and deterrence in 
the context of white-collar crime).
262. Natalie M. Schell-Busey, The Deterrent Effects of Ethics Codes for Corporate 
Crime: A Meta-Analysis 90 (2009) (Ph.D. dissertation, U. Md. College Park).
263. Andrea Schoepfer, Stephanie Carmichael & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Do Perceptions of 
Punishment Vary Between White-Collar and Street Crimes?, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 151, 157 (2007). In 
particular, survey respondents were asked: “Who do you think is more likely to get caught by 
the authorities, someone who commits robbery and steals $1,000 or someone who commits 
fraud and steals $1,000?” Id. at 156.
264. See id. at 158–59 (“[E]ducation and income were robust predictors of certainty and 
severity perceptions indicating that more educated respondents and those with higher in-
comes were more likely to perceive that street crimes, such as robbery, were more likely to 
be detected and punished more severely than white-collar crimes, such as fraud.”).
265. Melissa L. Rorie, Sally S. Simpson, Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Ex-
amining Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Corporate Offending and Overcompliance: The Efficacy 
of Direct and Indirect Regulatory Interactions, 40 L. & POL’Y 172, 184–85, 187 (2018).
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The conclusions of the reviewers of survey data from the Na-
tional Public Survey on White-Collar Crime are also instructive:
More educated and wealthier individuals were less likely to 
view white-collar crimes as being more certain of detection 
and less likely to be punished than street crimes, especially 
with regard to how they perceived the criminal justice sys-
tem currently operated. Although this might be due to the 
two crimes studied herein, one wonders whether this was 
due to the fact that for white-collar/corporate employment, 
(advanced) education tends to be a requirement. Or it
could be that more educated and wealthier individuals 
happen to have more experience with the (successful) 
commission of fraud and perceive that the crime goes 
largely undetected.
. . . [T]he data revealed that those with greater education 
and income perceived there to be less certainty and severity 
of punishment for white-collar offenses than street crimes. 
This suggested that those most likely to have access to 
white-collar crime opportunities believed there was little 
chance of getting caught and receiving a severe penalty.266
The effectiveness of white-collar deterrence through regulation is 
also questionable. A review of the deterrent effect of administrative 
agencies on corporate crime concluded that 
[i]f we take a strict definition of deterrence . . . , then the 
threat of regulatory sanction and the subsequent fear that 
derives from this threat are relatively miniscule. Reactive 
enforcement, small budgets and staff, agency capture, few 
punitive options, and so forth mitigate the likelihood that 
firm illegality will be discovered (certainty) and harshly 
sanctioned (severity).267
Another, more recent review of corporate compliance with envi-
ronmental standards observed that “[e]mpirical research findings 
on the subject of large firm corporate environmental compliance 
are inconsistent. Some studies show that regulatory activity (such as 
monitoring and inspections) reduces corporate environmental 
noncompliance, but others fail to find a deterrent effect or find 
that deterrence matters only in certain settings.”268 Another study 
266. Schoepfer et al., supra note 263, at 160.
267. SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 97 (2002).
268. Melissa L. Rorie et al., supra note 265, at 175 (citations omitted).
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of corporate environmental compliance found that internal com-
pliance mechanisms do not affect compliance levels and “had no 
significant impact on behavioral intentions.”269
By contrast, one factor that has been found to contribute sub-
stantially to deterrence of corporate crime is the perceived risk of 
informal sanctions such as reputational harm.270 Indeed, “informal 
sanctions may be a more salient and direct influence on behavior 
than formal sanctions.”271 Of course, the converse is also true: au-
thorities that lack the power or wherewithal to impose informal 
sanctions will not have this deterrence arrow in their quiver.
A recent review of the literature on corporate crime deterrence 
found that the most effective way to deter white collar crime is with 
a combination of governing law, punitive sanctions, and regulatory 
policy.272 And, in particular, regulatory policy was found to have 
“produced a significant deterrent effect” when the policy in ques-
tion “provided for inspections/inquiries and enforcement.”273
All that said, uncertainty abounds in this area. As one study ob-
served: “Little is known about what works, what’s promising, and 
what doesn’t in the prevention and control of corporate crime.”274
4. Deterrence Theory and Government Ethics
This review of deterrence scholarship suggests that the current 
system of ethics compliance and enforcement is, bluntly put, an 
example of what not to do. An environmental crime study con-
cluded that “[i]n general, the risk of environmental crime appears
least likely when there is a credible legal threat for noncompliance 
and/or when one perceives informal consequences associated with 
offending, such as losing the respect of one’s significant others, to 
be certain and costly.”275 This is almost the exact opposite of the 
reality facing government officials inclined to engage in wrongdo-
269. Simpson et al., supra note 228, at 263, 265.
270. See generally SIMPSON, supra note 267, at 106–11.
271. SALLY S. SIMPSON, DEBRA L. SHAPIRO, CHRISTINE M. BECKMAN & GERALD S. MARTIN,
PREVENTING AND CONTROLLING CORPORATE CRIME: THE DUAL ROLE OF CORPORATE BOARDS 
AND LEGAL SANCTIONS 12 (2020), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/254622.pdf;
see also Simpson et al., supra note 228, at 261 (“Informal sanctions exert a strong inhibiting 
effect on offending; individuals who perceive the informal costs associated with violating 
environmental law to be more certain and severe are significantly less willing to violate.”).
272. See Schell-Busey et al., supra note 260, at 389.
273. Id. at 404.
274. SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 271, at 9; see also N. Craig Smith, Sally S. Simpson & 
Chun-Yao Huang, Why Managers Fail to Do The Right Thing: An Empirical Study Of Unethical & 
Illegal Conduct, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 633 (2007) (providing an overview of the literature on 
corporate crime deterrence).
275. Simpson et al., supra note 228, at 266.
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ing. Despite an elaborate set of laws and rules, actual enforcement 
actions are extremely rare. Because there is little reason to fear be-
ing caught and punished, the fear of consequences is accordingly 
lessened. Though few government employees will have any idea of 
the actual (low) number of criminal or disciplinary actions, they 
will perceive little evidence of actual enforcement around them.
And because enforcement is so rare, most employees will not only 
not know anyone personally who has been subject to enforcement, 
they also will not know of any such person.276 Finally, ethics officials
have very limited authority to engage in the inspections and inves-
tigations that provide for effective regulatory deterrence or to take 
actions that amount to informal sanctions.277
Moreover, to the extent the speed of apprehension and pun-
ishment is a factor in deterrence, it is very much one that works 
against the effectiveness of government ethics laws and rules. Of
course, the criminal justice system works no faster for government 
ethics prosecutions than for other complex white-collar matters.
For example, the prosecution of Corrine Brown’s alleged criminal 
conspiracy stretched back to 2012,278 but Rep. Brown’s sentence 
did not begin until 2018.279 The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion branch chief discussed above pleaded guilty in 2017 to report-
ing violations that began in 2002.280
Furthermore, even the more common non-criminal sanctions 
for violations of ethics rules typically result from a long process.
Federal ethics officials—whether from OGE, agency ethics offices, 
or inspectors general offices—cannot personally sanction employ-
ees even after they identify a violation. Rather, they must bring the
matter to the attention of the relevant supervisor, who must de-
termine whether to take any action against the employee. In addi-
tion, an employee has a right to challenge adverse personnel ac-
tions through the Merit Systems Protection Board. Those cases, if
fully contested, typically take up to a year to reach resolution be-
276. For a discussion of the gap between actual punishment rates and perceived pun-
ishment rates, see generally R. Paternoster, Perceptual Deterrence Theory, in 23 DETERRENCE,
CHOICE, AND CRIME: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 81 (Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & 
Cheryl Lero Jonson, eds. 2018).
277. See Schell-Busey et al., supra note 260, at 407.
278. Indictment at ¶ 15, United States v. Brown, No. 3:16-cr-00093-TCJ-JRK (M.D. Fla. July 
6, 2016).
279. Former Congresswoman Corrine Brown Reports to Prison on Fraud, Other Charges, ATLANTA 
J. CONST. (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/national/former-congresswoman-
corrine-brown-reports-prison-fraud-other-charges/U8YLfFxAwNzRaqYl7lulZK/ [https://
perma.cc/K9NV-G62G].
280. 2017 CONFLICT SURVEY, supra note 183, at 7–8.
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fore an administrative judge.281 And, even then, the disciplined 
employee can appeal.
Moreover, in the absence of formal legal or disciplinary conse-
quences, government ethics regulators have a highly limited ability 
to impose informal sanctions. With rare exceptions involving high-
profile figures,282 suspected offenders’ names are rarely publi-
cized—either internally within the agency or externally—when no 
formal punishment is meted out. Indeed, even publicly available 
inspector general reports that recount wrongdoing within an 
agency frequently redact or use aliases in place of the names of the 
wrongdoers pursuant to the federal Privacy Act.283
It is conceivable that the government’s massive ethics infrastruc-
ture may serve a deterrent effect not just by training and guiding 
officials on proper compliance but also by serving as a metaphori-
cal, visible “police presence.” As Daniel Nagin has explained, 
“[T]here is substantial evidence that increasing the visibility of the 
police by hiring more officers and allocating existing officers in 
ways that materially heighten the perceived risk of apprehension 
deters crimes.”284 But this is a highly imperfect analogy when ap-
plied to government ethics laws and rules because government eth-
ics officials are not police or prosecutors. Their ability to pursue 
wrongdoers is highly constrained, and their ability to punish 
wrongdoers is nil.285 The simple fact that a governmental depart-
ment might include an ethics office—even a large and expensive 
one—is very different from a potential car thief who sees police 
constantly patrolling a crime-ridden neighborhood. Moreover, the 
deterrent effect of regulatory agencies is questionable.286
As discussed above, in the exceptional cases where criminal 
charges are brought, they usually operate as supplemental charges 
to instances of blatant bribery or abuse of power.287 “Run-of-the-
mill” ethics violations, even ones that implicate the criminal stat-
utes, typically go unaddressed. If certainty of being caught is the 
281. See, e.g., Mike Ivancie, Q & A with a Merit Systems Protection Board Representative,
IVANCIE L. (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.ivancielaw.com/federal-employment-law/q-a-with-a-
merit-systems-protection-board-representative/ [https://perma.cc/T5YZ-KQ8Y].
282. See supra Section II.C (discussing Kellyanne Conway).
283. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). See generally DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSPECTOR GENERAL 
INSTRUCTION 5400.11 (Jan. 29, 2010) (implementing the Privacy Act as applied to the In-
spector General’s office); U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., Report No. 
20-0099 (Sept. 1, 2020) (investigative report using aliases such as “GSA Official 1” in place of 
names).
284. Nagin, supra note 245, at 158.
285. See discussion supra Part III.
286. See SIMPSON, supra note 267, at 98.
287. See supra Section III.D.
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key factor in deterrence, then there must be very little deterrence 
indeed.
The complexity of the applicable rules also creates a barrier to 
reliable compliance. One commentator, himself a government eth-
ics lawyer, has argued:
Expecting new government employees to read these 
rules—let alone understand and remember them—is akin 
to expecting consumers to read and understand “click-
through” licenses for new software. Even if read, there is al-
so rarely any effort to test whether employees can recall or 
understand the rules. Distributing a lengthy tome on the 
rules of conduct—particularly if done along with a slew of 
other documents and forms to be read and completed—is 
an ineffective way to assure that employees know that they 
are expected to behave ethically.288
The same commentator has questioned the efficacy of ethics train-
ing programs in particular in fostering compliance with the rules:
Though good training can effectively transfer knowledge of 
those rules that are malum prohibitum, the benefit in 
terms of fostering ethics or reducing corruption is slim . . . .
Indeed, the lack of training or knowledge of the rules does 
little to explain ethical failure. According to a 2005 ethics 
survey, improper training or ignorance that a particular ac-
tion was unethical is only the fifth most likely cause of ethi-
cal lapse, behind pressure to meet unrealistic goals, the de-
sire for career enhancement, assuring continued 
employment, and working in an environment with poor 
morale.289
B. The Limits of OGE
The central repository of ethics in the federal government is—or 
is supposed to be—OGE. But OGE, as currently structured, focuses
almost entirely on preventing ethics violations rather than identify-
ing and addressing past violations. OGE’s organization consists of 
the Office of the Director, the Internal Operations Division, the 
General Counsel and Legal Policy Division, the Program Counsel 
288. Lager, supra note 12, at 73.
289. Id. at 74.
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Division, and the Compliance Division.290 All of these divisions deal 
with compliance, education, and oversight of federal agency ethics 
programs.291 None of them focus on enforcement, investigation, or 
auditing. Simply put, OGE is not equipped to be, and does not 
function as, the ethics police of the federal government.
Should it? It is striking that the federal government has no divi-
sion of investigation or enforcement with respect to government 
ethics laws and rules. This is in marked contrast to various other 
areas of federal regulation, which have dedicated agency enforce-
ment. To give ten prominent examples:
• The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of En-
forcement investigates and prosecutes civil suits for viola-
tions of federal securities law.292
• The Federal Trade Commission’s Division of Enforcement 
litigates a variety of consumer protection matters.293
• The Federal Communications Commission’s Enforcement 
Bureau is “responsible for enforcing the provisions of the 
Communications Act, the Commission’s rules, orders, and 
various licensing terms and conditions.”294
• Different offices at the Environmental Protection Agency 
pursue a variety of enforcement actions for violations of 
environmental law.295
• The Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Division of 
Enforcement “investigates and prosecutes alleged viola-
tions of the Commodity Exchange Act . . . and Commission 
regulations.”296
290. Organization, supra note 67.
291. General Counsel & Legal Policy Division, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www2.
oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/Organization/General%20Counsel%20&%20Legal%20Policy%20
Division [https://perma.cc/L8SC-2D8S] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Program Counsel Division,
U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www2.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/Organization/Program
%20Counsel%20Division [https://perma.cc/DB76-YS8U] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Com-
pliance Division, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, https://www2.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf
/Organization/Compliance%20Division [https://perma.cc/4T4K-UXMU] (last visited Nov. 
1, 2020).
292. Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/page
/enforcement-section-landing [https://perma.cc/EFC2-VA2R] (Nov. 1, 2020).
293. Division of Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-enforcement [https://perma.cc
/7AEC-4BNE] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
294. Enforcement, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/enforcement [https:
//perma.cc/ZP9T-9E4H] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
295. Enforcement, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement [https://
perma.cc/FT2T-SC6S] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
296. Enforcement, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov
/LawRegulation/Enforcement/index.htm [https://perma.cc/45BV-D9Q5] (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2020).
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• The Federal Election Commission’s Enforcement Division 
“investigates alleged violations of the law, . . . directly nego-
tiates conciliation agreements, which may include civil 
penalties and other remedies,” and its Litigation Division 
pursues enforcement actions in court.297
• The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Office of 
Enforcement “[i]nitiates and executes investigations of 
possible violations of the Commission’s rules, orders, and 
regulations” and “pursues remedies through negotiation 
or litigation.”298
• The Federal Aviation Authority’s Enforcement Division 
“initiates legal enforcement actions to address noncompli-
ance by regulated entities and persons.”299
• U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Office of 
Enforcement and Removal Operations’s stated mission is 
“[t]o identify, arrest, and remove aliens who present a 
danger to national security or are a risk to public safety, as 
well as those who enter the United States illegally or oth-
erwise undermine the integrity of our immigration laws 
and our border control efforts.”300
• The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
Departmental Enforcement Center enforces “the Depart-
ment’s statutory and regulatory requirements,” including 
through “various sanctions, including suspension and de-
barment from Government business,” civil penalties, 
“abat[ing] owners’ federal subsidy payments and, if neces-
sary, foreclos[ure] on properties.”301
Ultimately, OGE is an almost uniquely powerless federal agency 
in terms of its ability to enforce the laws it oversees. All of the regu-
latory agencies listed above have formal investigative authority, in 
many cases including subpoena powers, and all have the ability to 
litigate against alleged violators. OGE does not even have the abil-
297. Associate General Counsel for Enforcement, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://transition.
fec.gov/about/offices/OGC/AGC_enforcement.shtml#enf [https://perma.cc/QAQ5-8FP4] 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
298. Office of Enforcement, FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/about/
offices/office-enforcement-oe [https://perma.cc/E5BA-GHXU] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
299. Legal Enforcement Actions, U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about
/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/enforcement/enforcement_actions/
[https://perma.cc/ET4K-6ERU] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
300. Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice
.gov/ero#wcm-survey-target-id [https://perma.cc/97CY-TNZE] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
301. DEC Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., DEPARTMENTAL 
ENF’T CTR., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/enforcement/faq [https://perma.cc
/565S-H5UT] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
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ity to require disciplinary action against a violator. It is quite unu-
sual for an agency with primary oversight responsibility over a par-
ticular area of law and regulation, and the foremost expertise in 
that area within the government, to have no enforcement power 
whatsoever. OGE’s complete lack of enforcement authority and 
highly limited independent investigative authority constrain its 
ability to combat ethics violations.302
Nor do federal agency ethics offices or agency inspectors gen-
eral fill this gap. Agency ethics officials and inspectors general have 
at most the ability to make recommendations. They have only the 
authority to recommend to senior agency officials that disciplinary 
action be taken against a violator. And they, like OGE, have no en-
forcement authority at all with respect to the ethics statutes; that 
responsibility falls solely to the DOJ, which pursues criminal or 
even civil actions only in exceptional cases.303
One might counter that complaints about OGE’s limited en-
forcement and investigative powers misunderstand OGE’s purpose.
OGE does have significant rule-writing, educational, advisory, in-
formation-gathering, and public outreach functions.
But the question is whether the status quo is preferable to possi-
ble alternatives. Under current law and practice, OGE’s authority is 
confined to advisory, educational, preventive, consultative, and 
rulemaking functions. The limits of its power are illustrated by 
former Director Shaub’s extraordinary tweetstorm and other pub-
lic statements critical of President Trump in early 2017.304 These 
actions can reasonably be read as the head of an independent 
agency chafing at the constraints of his office. Because Shaub had 
little ability to take concrete action against what he perceived as a 
flouting of the rules and norms of government ethics, he instead 
took to Twitter to try to publicly shame—or at a minimum get the 
attention of—both the President and the press through highly un-
usual sarcasm and criticism. Lacking a cudgel, OGE’s Director in-
stead resorted to the megaphone through these attention-seeking 
tactics.
Moreover, a highly decentralized system of agency-specific ethics 
offices may not make sense for enforcing rules and laws that are 
largely uniform across the executive branch. To the extent indi-
vidual agencies are charged with enforcing ethics rules for their 
particular employees, there is a risk of disparate enforcement and 
punishment for the same violations. Not only is this potentially un-
fair, it is also legally risky for the government. An employee chal-
302. See discussion supra Section II.A.
303. See discussion supra Sections II.B–C.
304. See supra Section II.A.
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lenging a disciplinary action, termination or otherwise, would cer-
tainly point to differing levels of punishment across agencies for 
the same types of violations. This varied treatment could form the 
basis for a challenge to the action before the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board.305 It almost certainly would also lead to some allega-
tions that the disparate treatment was based on the employee’s
membership in a protected class.306
C. When Ethics Officials Do Have Power: A Brief Case Study
In government, as in life, leverage matters. And federal ethics of-
ficials’ leverage is at its strongest in one circumstance: when a pres-
idential administration is seeking to nominate an individual for a 
position requiring Senate confirmation. Under current executive 
branch practice and procedures, the White House will not normal-
ly nominate someone until OGE has “precleared” that person’s fi-
nancial disclosures. This means that before the President formally 
nominates the candidate by submitting her name to the Senate, 
the potential nominee will submit her draft 278e financial disclo-
sure form to the government.307 The draft 278e form is reviewed by 
ethics officials at the nominee’s future agency and at OGE.308 One 
hundred percent of the time,309 the ethics officials will have follow-
up questions about the 278e, with inquiries about the person’s as-
sets, income, and positions. Necessary edits are made to the draft 
278e before it is finalized. From that finalized form, agency ethics 
officials (often with input from OGE) will identify the asset divesti-
tures, resignations, and other actions the future nominee must 
take in order to avoid conflicts of interest.310
Ethics officials, based on their review of the nominee’s financial 
disclosures and perhaps other communications with the nominee, 
will then draft an “ethics agreement” or “ethics letter” for the nom-
305. See generally Jurisdiction, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., https://www.mspb.gov/About/
jurisdiction.htm [https://perma.cc/82PM-BZBZ] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).
306. See generally Federal Employees & Job Applicants, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal-sector/federal-employees-job-applicants [https://
perma.cc/PRW5-ME5V] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021).




309. The one hundred percent number is an approximation but is consistent with the 
author’s experience representing clients being considered for presidential appointments.
310. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.801–805; Dale Christopher, Ethics Agreements: Where Ethics Obliga-
tions Become Action, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS (July 24, 2019), https://www.oge.gov/
web/oge.nsf/Resources/Ethics+Agreements:+Where+Ethics+Obligations+Become+Action 
[https://perma.cc/B7E8-7TTB].
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inee’s signature.311 In this agreement, the future nominee affirms 
her understanding of various ethics laws and rules, agrees to abide 
by those laws and rules, and commits to take certain actions and 
refrain from certain actions in order to ensure compliance. For 
example, a letter may say: “Within 90 days of confirmation, I will 
divest all my interests in Los Pollos Hermanos Company.” Or it 
may say: “Upon confirmation, I will resign from my position as a 
Director of Vandelay Industries.”
Only after the 278e form and the ethics agreement are finalized 
to the satisfaction of OGE will OGE notify the White House that 
the person has been precleared for nomination.312 Although the 
White House is not legally prohibited from forwarding a nomina-
tion before preclearance, in practice all recent administrations 
have been reluctant to do so.
Part of this leverage is based on OGE’s statutory authority with 
respect to certification of nominee 278e reports. The Ethics in 
Government Act provides that a nominee must submit a financial 
disclosure statement within five days of her Senate nomination.313
Moreover, the report must be made “current” no later than the 
date of the nominee’s Senate confirmation hearing.314 OGE’s Di-
rector is then authorized to review the report and to determine 
whether “the individual submitting such report is in compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations.”315 If OGE’s review leads it to 
conclude that “additional information is required to be submitted, 
[it] shall notify the individual submitting such report what addi-
tional information is required and the time by which it must be 
submitted.”316 OGE essentially has full independence in determin-
ing whether to certify a report—or not.317
The same statute gives OGE equal authority to refuse to certify 
the annual reports of officials already in government, but by that 
point OGE’s leverage is mostly gone. For example, after identifying 
inaccuracies in the Secretary of Commerce’s financial reporting 
for 2018, OGE refused to certify his annual financial disclosure re-
port.318 But the Secretary remained in the job with no disciplinary 
measures or direct adverse consequences to his role.319
311. 5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.801–805 (2018). For DOJ nominees, the letter is signed by a senior 
Department ethics official rather than by the nominee herself, but the nominee will sepa-
rately confirm her commitment to abide by the terms of the letter.
312. U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS, supra note 307, at §4.10.
313. 5 U.S.C. App. § 101(b)(1).
314. Id.
315. Id. § 106(b)(1).
316. Id. § 106(b)(2)(A).
317. Id. § 106(b)(2); 5 CFR § 2634.605(b)(3) (2018).
318. Letter from Emory A. Rounds, Dir., U.S. Off. of Gov’t Ethics, to David Maggi, Des-
ignated Agency Ethics Off. & Chief of the Ethics L. and Program Divs., Off. of the Gen. 
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OGE’s power in this particular unique circumstance—its ability 
to hold up a nominee for high office—provides broader lessons for 
enhancing the clout of federal ethics officials generally. For exam-
ple, if it identifies ethics violations by a particular official, OGE 
could be given the authority to block an official’s promotion, or 
even to enjoin her continued employment, pending resolution of 
the issue. An affected official could be afforded due process pro-
tections similar to those allowed through the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board, but giving OGE the authority to prevent an agency 
from promoting or continuing to employ a rule-breaking official,
would make it a significantly more powerful organization.
D. Proposed Reforms
While criticisms of the existing federal ethics regime abound, ac-
tual detailed reform proposals are harder to find. Indeed, the pres-
idential ethics pledges are notable for how they only incrementally 
expand federal officials’ existing ethics obligations, and how they 
are virtually never enforced.320
When reforms to the existing laws and rules have been pro-
posed, they have tended to be either marginal changes to existing 
substantive ethics standards, or—in clear response to widely re-
ported perceived abuses—focused on the President’s individual 
ethical obligations. Most reform proposals have not focused on the 
federal system of ethics compliance and enforcement.
For example, in 2018, Senator and then-presidential candidate 
Elizabeth Warren proposed the Anti-Corruption and Public Integ-
rity Act.321 The ethics component of the Act would do such things 
as “require senior government officials and White House staff to 
divest from privately-owned assets that could present conflicts, in-
cluding large companies and commercial real estate,” and “require 
most executive branch employees to recuse from all issues that 
might financially benefit themselves or a previous employer or cli-
Couns. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www2.oge.gov/web/OGE.nsf/0/955C1F75C94F1D1
F852583A60074C4CB/$FILE/Letter%20to%20Commerce%20DAEO.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L7Q7-FN8R].
319. See e.g., Carrie Levine, ‘Not In Compliance’: Wilbur Ross, The Trump Official Who Keeps 
Watchdogs Up at Night, NPR (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/27/696824206/
not-in-compliance-wilbur-ross-the-trump-official-who-keeps-watchdogs-up-at-night [https://
perma.cc/BYA8-U543].
320. See supra Sections I.C, III.C.
321. Anti-Corruption and Public Integrity Act, WARREN.SENATE.GOV, https://www.warren.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Master%20Summary%20of%20Anti%20Corruption%20Act
%20-%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/465N-NJAS] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020) (bill sum-
mary).
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ent from the preceding 4 years.”322 The former proposal is essen-
tially identical to the existing financial conflict of interest statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 208, and the latter simply extends OGE’s impartiality 
rule as applied to officials’ former employers from one year to four 
years.323
Likewise, a report from the Brennan Center for Justice advocat-
ed for closing “the loophole exempting the president and vice 
president from the general standards of conduct established under 
federal conflict of interest law” and expanding financial disclosure 
requirements for senior officials, particularly the President.324 As 
noted above, the presidential exemption to the conflict-of-interest 
laws has only been a significant issue for a single President,325 and 
financial disclosure requirements under current law are already 
quite burdensome.
Former OGE Director Walter Shaub himself has advanced a 
number of reform proposals.326 For example, he argues for chang-
ing the law so that the President may only remove OGE’s Director 
for cause.327 Though a potentially effective prophylactic measure to 
safeguard the agency’s independence, it would address a threat 
that is more theoretical than real. In practice, agency ethics offi-
cials and others who deal with OGE know that it already does op-
erate as a quite self-contained and fiercely independent agency, 
and its employees—composed almost entirely of career officials ra-
ther than political appointees—tend to jealously guard the Office’s
mission and prerogatives. Indeed, the possibility that Shaub him-
self would be fired did not stop him from going to war with the 
White House in 2017.328
Shaub also argues for the establishment of “a Special Inspector 
General for Small Executive Agencies . . . with regular jurisdiction 
over the many small agencies in the executive branch that lack In-
spectors General and special jurisdiction to conduct ethics investi-
gations.”329 But this is essentially a gap-filling measure to cover the 
small minority of federal agency employees who are not subject to 
the dozens of existing inspectors general.
322. Id. at 1.
323. See supra Section I.A (discussing 18 U.S.C. §208).
324. DANIEL I. WEINER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., STRENGTHENING PRESIDENTIAL ETHICS 
LAW 7–8 (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_
Strengthening%20Presidential%20Ethics%20Law.%20Daniel%20Weiner.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C9DY-YZJ2].
325. See supra Section I.A.
326. See Shaub, supra note 117, at 1.
327. Id. at 3.
328. See supra Section II.A.
329. Shaub, supra note 117, at 13–14.
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Shaub also supports increased public access to such information 
as officials’ compliance with ethics rules, use of government air-
craft, officials’ interest in discretionary trusts, and the ethics transi-
tion plans of presidential candidates.330 But again, these changes 
would all be marginal adjustments to requirements already in 
place.
One exception to the trend toward incremental reform is the 
advocacy group Issue One, which has proposed several potentially 
major changes to the Executive Branch ethics program. One would 
be to “[a]uthorize OGE to investigate allegations of ethics viola-
tions for high-ranking employees (Presidential appointments with 
and without Senate confirmation, SES and Schedule C).”331 As dis-
cussed in Section II.A, OGE already has the authority to investigate 
any agency employee of any level, at least when the Director de-
termines that an agency investigation “has not been conducted 
within a reasonable time.”332 The regulation itself, though,
acknowledges that it will be a “rare case” in which these procedures 
prove necessary.333 A reform that allows OGE to self-initiate investi-
gations of high-level officials, without first having to go through 
agency ethics officers, could streamline the process and make it 
more regularized.
Perhaps more profoundly, Issue One also proposes additional 
investigative powers for OGE: “Clarify that the Director of OGE has 
the authority to conduct investigations, subpoena witnesses, com-
pel production of documents and issue civil penalties for violations 
for high-ranking officials.”334 This would be a significant change 
because OGE does not currently have subpoena power or any oth-
er way to compel documents from government officials or anyone 
else. Likewise, neither OGE nor agency ethics officials have the 
power to issue civil penalties for violations of ethics rules.
Another pair of recommendations would allow OGE to engage 
in random oversight of agency ethics offices and individual em-
ployees.
First, Issue One recommends that rules be changed to 
“[a]uthorize OGE to conduct random reviews of decisions by eth-
ics officials for each agency.”335 To allow random reviews of agency 
ethics decisions would, in part, allow OGE to function as an overall 
330. Id. at 17–25.
331. Memorandum from Issue One to Ed. Bds. 6 (May 23, 2017), https://www.issueone.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IO-OGE-Edit-Memo-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/837X-
2YPQ].
332. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.504(b) (2017).
333. Id. § 2638.504.
334. Memorandum from Issue One to Ed. Bds., supra note 331, at 2.
335. Id. at 7.
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inspector general for the federal executive branch. Or, in effect, 
act as an inspector general to inspectors general, insofar as agency 
IG offices themselves play a role in policing employee ethics. But 
ultimately, if OGE cannot override those decisions, its role is limited 
to a hortatory one and is duplicative of agency inspectors general, 
who can already effectively do the same thing when notified of a 
problem.
Second, Issue One recommends: “Authorize OGE to conduct 
random audits of public and confidential financial disclosures to 
ensure the accuracy of the document.”336 To allow random audits 
of financial disclosure reports would allow OGE to function as an 
IRS for federal employees. In practice, agency ethics officials tend 
to pay close attention to the financial disclosure reports of high-
level agency officials. But even in those instances where ethics offi-
cials review and provide feedback and questions on an official’s
public financial disclosure report, they almost never ask for actual
documentation of an employee’s assets and income. Agency ethics 
officials do not have subpoena or formal audit power over agency 
employees. It is questionable whether a reform that gives OGE the 
power to randomly and formally audit federal officials’ financial 
statements would substantially deter officials from engaging in 
wrongdoing. Moreover, financial disclosure is already by far the 
most onerous ethics requirement for executive branch employees 
from a compliance standpoint.337
As for avoiding and deterring financial conflicts of interest, per-
haps a more effective solution would be to facilitate information 
sharing between the IRS and OGE. Under current law, the IRS is 
generally prohibited from sharing individuals’ tax information out-
side the agency, including with other government agencies.338 Tax 
return information can be shared with other federal agencies for a 
variety of purposes if the necessary conditions are met,339 but none 
of these exceptions expressly allow the IRS to share return infor-
mation with OGE or agency ethics officials for the purpose of de-
termining whether the employees have violated ethics rules.340 A
336. Id.
337. See supra Section II.D.
338. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a).
339. See id. § 6103(h)–(l).
340. The closest exception is a section that allows disclosure to
officers and employees of any Federal agency who are personally and directly en-
gaged in . . . preparation for any judicial or administrative proceeding pertaining 
to the enforcement of a specifically designated Federal criminal statute (not in-
volving tax administration) to which the United States or such agency is or may be 
a party, or . . . any investigation which may result in such a proceeding.
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change in the law to allow OGE to request information from the 
IRS could go a long way toward ensuring that officials are not re-
porting one thing to tax authorities—which do have broad investi-
gative and enforcement powers—and another to ethics authorities.
Another set of reform proposals comes from the National Task 
Force on the Rule of Law & Democracy, an initiative of the Bren-
nan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law that is co-chaired by 
former New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman and former 
Southern District of New York United States Attorney Preet Bha-
rara. As part of a broader set of public policy reforms, the Task 
Force sets forth six proposals regarding government ethics.341
Three of the proposals deal with financial disclosure; one advo-
cates stricter means for enforcing the Emoluments Clauses of the 
Constitution; and one advocates extending the federal conflict of 
interest laws to the President and Vice-President.342 As with some 
other reform proposals discussed above, these proposals target is-
sues specific to President Trump.
The Task Force’s sixth proposal, however, focuses on a series of 
reforms to OGE. The first such reform would be to “[s]pecify that 
the president cannot remove OGE’s director during his or her 
statutory term except for good cause.”343 As mentioned, though,
OGE already functions as a highly independent agency and the 
threats to that independence have been purely hypothetical. But 
perhaps more significantly, the Task Force recommends a number 
of other changes to enhance OGE’s authority, including expanded 
investigative and enforcement power.344 As discussed later in Sec-
tion IV.F, these types of reforms, if implemented, would be more 
likely to have widespread deterrent effects.
Finally, in early 2019, the newly installed Democratic majority of 
the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1,345 a wide-ranging series 
of changes to federal election and ethics laws. Most of the ethics 
sections of the bill dealt with the President, Congress, the courts, 
Id. § 6103(i)(A). However, criminal statutes are only a subset of the federal ethics infrastruc-
ture. Moreover, OGE and agency ethics officials are expressly prohibited from “mak[ing] a 
finding as to whether . . . any . . . criminal law of the United States . . . has been or is being 
violated.” 5 C.F.R. § 2638.502 (2018). Accordingly, it is doubtful whether the IRS currently 
has the ability to share federal officials’ tax return information with OGE, or for that matter 
any agency ethics officials.
341. PREET BHARARA, CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, MIKE CASTLE, CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR.,
CHUCK HAGEL, DAVID IGLESIAS, AMY COMSTOCK RICK, DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR., NAT’L TASK 
FORCE ON RULE OF L. & DEMOCRACY, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 4–15 (2018), https:
//www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_TaskForceReport_2018_
09.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKK6-YWXN].
342. Id. at 5–10.
343. Id. at 13.
344. Id. at 13, 15.
345. H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019).
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and lobbying disclosure.346 One section of the bill, however, titled 
the Executive Branch Comprehensive Ethics Enforcement Act of 
2019, addressed OGE.347 In addition to reauthorizing the office, 
the bill also would have made the Director removable only for 
cause and clarified OGE’s rights with respect to ethics matters in 
the White House.348 But perhaps most significantly in the long run, 
the bill would have enhanced OGE’s investigative authority by giv-
ing it subpoena power.349 The Senate never took up H.R. 1.
E. A Modest Reform: Ethical “Sentencing Guidelines”
As discussed in Section IV.A.1 of this Article, the certainty of 
punishment is a key factor in the deterrence of wrongdoing.
Where punishment, if any, for a given violation is uncertain, peo-
ple will feel less incentive to comply with the rule in question than 
if they know that breaking it will lead to a specific consequence.
And that is exactly the case for disciplinary violations of govern-
ment ethics rules. In the rare cases where wrongdoing leads to dis-
cipline, the severity of punishment can vary across and within 
agencies.
One possible stopgap solution to the decentralized and some-
times haphazard enforcement of ethics rules is for OGE to issue 
“sentencing guidelines” for various violations of ethics rules. A uni-
form set of prescribed punishments for ethical breaches, applica-
ble across the executive branch, would provide guidance for agen-
cy ethics officials and other officials as to how to respond to 
identified violations.
Such guidelines could be issued as a legal advisory or as formal 
rulemaking. Since OGE frequently issues legal advisories on a host 
of topics relating to government ethics laws and rules, guidance on 
the proper level of punishment for violations might be welcome.
OGE has express statutory authority to issue such opinions.350 A
counterargument might be that these advisories do not have any 
force of law, and an employee subject to sanction under the OGE 
disciplinary guidelines might challenge it as such.
A formal act of rulemaking would be a much more significant 
undertaking, as it would require OGE to engage in a notice-and-
comment period and other requirements under the Administrative 
346. Id. tit. VII–X.
347. Id. tit. VIII, subtit. D.
348. Id. §§ 8032–34.
349. Id. § 8034(d)(2)(B).
350. 5 U.S.C. app. § 402(b)(8).
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Procedure Act. OGE does, however, engage in significant formal 
rulemaking, most recently in its amendments to the outside gift 
rule, which went into effect at the start of 2017.351
OGE likely has the statutory authority to issue guidelines for ap-
propriate disciplinary levels through formal rulemaking. The Eth-
ics in Government Act provides that OGE’s Director is responsible 
for “developing . . . rules and regulations to be promulgated by the 
President or the Director pertaining to conflicts of interest and 
ethics in the executive branch.”352
Disciplinary guidelines could be detailed and focus not only on 
the type of violation but also its severity. These are analogous to 
the so-called Douglas factors generally used in federal Merit Systems 
Protection Board employment cases to determine if the discipli-
nary sanction imposed on an employee is appropriate.353 For ex-
ample, the disciplinary level for a violation of the gift rule could be 
based on some of these factors:
• The value of the prohibited gift.
• Whether the employee actively solicited the gift.
• Whether there was a clear and deliberate connection be-
tween the employee’s official position and the gift.
• Whether the employee did anything in his official capacity 
in return for the gift.
• Whether the employee sought advice from ethics officials 
or others before accepting the gift.
• Whether this is a repeat offense.
Likewise, the disciplinary level for a violation of the financial con-
flict of interest rule could consider the following factors:
• The value of the conflicting asset.
• Whether the asset is owned personally by the employee or 
is imputed through the ownership of another person.
• Whether the employee took any action that was likely to 
enhance the value of the conflicting asset.
• The actual or expected financial effect of the employee’s
actions or decisions on the affected asset.
351. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch; Amendment 
to the Standards Governing Solicitation and Acceptance of Gifts from Outside Sources, 81 
Fed. Reg. 81,641 (Nov. 18, 2016).
352. 5 U.S.C. app. §402(b)(1).
353. See Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981); Determining the Penalty, U.S.
MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., https://www.mspb.gov/studies/adverse_action_report/10_
DeterminingthePenalty.htm [https://perma.cc/5T5W-9MMP] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
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• Whether the employee sought advice from ethics officials 
or others before accepting the gift.
• Whether this is a repeat offense.
As detailed above, possible disciplinary actions that can be imposed 
on an employee include “reprimand, suspension, demotion, and 
removal.”354 There is less of a continuous spectrum in disciplinary 
actions than there is for criminal or civil penalties, where monetary 
fines, prison sentences, and length of probation can be adjusted 
upward or downward with mathematical precision. Among the 
types of discipline, there could be some variation in the length of a 
suspension or the severity of a demotion, though there are limits.
Once a suspension becomes long enough, it is effectively equiva-
lent to termination. Similarly, a person can only be demoted up to 
a point; it is not practical to demote a senior agency executive to 
the custodial staff.
F. An Immodest Reform: Empower Federal Ethics Officials to 
Investigate and Enforce Ethics Standards
The foregoing discussion has shown that (1) criminal and civil 
enforcement actions for violations of government ethics laws are 
rare and typically take years, (2) agency disciplinary measures 
against employees are also quite uncommon, (3) ethics officials at 
OGE and individual agencies have very limited investigative au-
thority and no enforcement authority, and, finally, (4) punishment 
for wrongdoing that is unlikely and slow in coming does not act as
an effective deterrent.
One solution to this conundrum is to create a more focused and 
streamlined enforcement process for ethics rules and to confer 
that authority upon an agency with a specific focus on the laws and 
rules in question.355 This agency could either be a new “investiga-
tion and enforcement division” within OGE, or—as considered be-
low—a separate and independent ethics agency. The agency could 
be called, for instance, the Ethics Investigation and Enforcement 
Agency (EIEA).
First, EIEA could be given the investigative tools that other law 
enforcement agencies have: in particular, the ability to conduct 
audits, issue subpoenas, and compel testimony. Some of this power 
354. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.102(g) (2020).
355. Some of the potential reforms discussed in this section share common elements 
with high-level proposals by the National Task Force on the Rule of Law & Democracy. See
BHARARA ET AL., supra note 341, at 13, 15.
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would be duplicative of the current authority of agency inspectors 
general, but the EIEA would be dedicated solely to government 
ethics violations, unlike the broader mandate of inspectors gen-
eral, and would investigate possible violations across the executive 
branch rather than focus on a single agency as inspectors general 
do.
Second, and even more radically, the EIEA could be given the 
authority to directly impose discipline on federal officials, notwith-
standing any action—or lack thereof—taken by the official’s own 
employing agency. This would be an extension of OGE’s existing, 
but rarely exercised, authority to independently recommend disci-
plinary action:356 the EIEA could override a decision by the em-
ployee’s own superiors not to impose discipline. And, after due 
process, the EIEA could actually impose the discipline itself. These 
consequences could include, potentially, demotion, suspension, or 
termination. The employee, if a career official, could then chal-
lenge such an action through the Merit Systems Protection Board, 
just as if the employee had been disciplined by his own agency.
To be sure, if the EIEA has the independent authority to impose 
discipline on an official of the Executive Branch even when the of-
ficial’s own agency declines to do so, it could lead to inter-agency 
disputes. Imagine, for instance, if the Office of Special Counsel 
had directly been able to fire, rather than just recommend the fir-
ing of, Kellyanne Conway, contrary to the White House’s wishes.357
Beyond that, actions to discipline high-level—even potentially Cab-
inet-level—officials could lead to immense public attention and 
raise Constitutional questions with respect to political appointees.
These possibilities weigh in favor of a narrow construction of the 
ethics agency’s disciplinary power to cover only instances where 
the violations of specific ethics standards are clear-cut and the eth-
ics agency has a good faith basis to believe that the other agency’s
response has been inadequate. In fact, the knowledge that EIEA 
may second-guess the laxity of an agency’s response to an ethical 
violation might also spur agency officials themselves to be more 
vigilant about addressing wrongdoing by their employees.
One step further would be to allow EIEA to pursue civil penal-
ties for significant violations. This power could take two general 
forms, not mutually exclusive to each other. First, EIEA could be 
authorized to impose fines through internal administrative actions, 
perhaps allowing a hearing before an administrative judge. A
356. 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.501, 504 (2002).
357. See supra Section II.C.
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number of federal agencies, such as the SEC,358 the FEC,359 the 
EPA,360 the FCC,361 and FERC,362 have power to impose fines 
through administrative actions.
Second, EIEA could be permitted to bring civil enforcement ac-
tions in court, as many other federal agencies do.363 All five agen-
cies mentioned above, among others, have the authority to bring 
civil actions in court against violators of the laws that they respec-
tively enforce.364 In addition to referring violations to the DOJ—
which, as shown above, rarely leads to prosecution—agency ethics 
officials could also refer such cases to the EIEA for civil enforce-
ment actions.
Importantly, EIEA’s authority to impose civil penalties would 
have to go beyond the employee’s federal employment; otherwise 
many violators could—and would—avoid the penalties simply by 
resigning their positions. Accordingly, EIEA’s jurisdiction would 
have to extend to former executive branch employees. This expan-
sion of power would not necessarily be so drastic: for example, 
OGE currently has the authority to require former officials to file 
“termination” financial disclosure reports within 30 days of their 
departure.365
Any of these changes would require either substantial changes to 
OGE’s statutory authority, structure, and professional staff, or the 
creation of a completely new agency. Enforcement attorneys and 
litigators, and perhaps administrative judges, would have to be 
hired. It would be a considerable expansion of OGE’s current 
358. See Administrative Proceedings, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov
/litigation/admin.shtml [https://perma.cc/H3KA-ZK2J] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
359. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 111.30–46; Administrative Fines, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https:
//www.fec.gov/legal-resources/enforcement/administrative-fines/ [https://perma.cc
/3G49-UPXR] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
360. See Basic Information on Enforcement, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov
/enforcement/basic-information-enforcement [https://perma.cc/R7LR-MM5F] (last visit-
ed Nov. 1, 2020).
361. See Enforcement Primer, FED. COMMC’N. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/general
/enforcement-primer [https://perma.cc/F7FC-J9KY] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
362. See Civil Penalties, U.S. FED. ENERGY REGUL COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov
/enforcement-legal/enforcement/civil-penalties [https://perma.cc/R4PM-DERR].
363. See also WEINER, supra note 324, at 9 (“It is also essential that OGE or another body 
be given real civil enforcement authority parallel to that of most other independent regula-
tory agencies.”).
364. See Litigation Releases, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/litigation
/litreleases.shtml [https://perma.cc/4CJS-H9QA] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Court Cases,
U.S. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/ [https://
perma.cc/453P-CJW9] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Basic Information on Enforcement, U.S. ENV’T
PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/basic-information-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/PTG8-6T3L] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020); Orders to Show Cause Proceedings,
FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/enforcement-legal/enforcement/civil-
penalties/orders-show-cause-proceedings [https://perma.cc/22MR-FJ4N] (last visited Jan. 
10, 2021).
365. 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 101(e); 5 C.F.R. § 2634.201(e) (2020).
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makeup of compliance and advisory attorneys. But if visible and ef-
ficient enforcement is an important component of deterrence, it 
could be a worthwhile investment.
CONCLUSION: A SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM?
One question is whether a dramatic expansion of the investiga-
tive and enforcement powers of federal ethics officials is really 
necessary. What purpose would it serve? It is unknown and perhaps 
unknowable whether the current ethics infrastructure is largely 
successful in preventing and, where necessary, addressing viola-
tions of government ethics rules. But the application of deterrence 
theory to the federal ethics regime strongly suggests that many vio-
lations are going undetected or at least unpunished.
Of course, just because OGE and agency ethics officials are una-
ble to directly enforce ethics statutes does not make those laws ir-
relevant. The DOJ has the authority to bring civil and criminal ac-
tions for violating these laws.366 That authority, however, is 
exercised in only exceptional cases—approximately ten such ac-
tions per year over the past decade, and almost invariably as a pe-
ripheral component of a larger case involving bribery or other bla-
tant criminality. The scant level of enforcement—quite 
reasonably—undermines public confidence that the laws are effec-
tive.
To be sure, not every technical violation of ethics laws should 
lead to criminal or civil enforcement. This is particularly the case 
for financial disclosure misreporting because the reporting re-
quirements are complex and amendments due to inadvertent er-
rors are extremely common. Just as amendments to IRS returns 
rarely lead to criminal tax evasion charges, fixes to financial disclo-
sures should not necessarily mandate punishment.
Or, take the example of the former Director of the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, who resigned from her position in 
2018 when it was discovered she had improperly purchased shares 
in tobacco, drug, and food companies while in office.367 The trades 
in question were a very small part of her net worth and may have 
been made by a portfolio manager trading on her behalf without 
her advance knowledge.368 In such a case, where there was no evi-
366. See supra Section II.C; 18 U.S.C. § 216 (prescribing DOJ’s authority to bring crimi-
nal and civil enforcement actions for violations of various ethics statutes).
367. Sheila Kaplan, Dr. Brenda Fitzgerald, C.D.C. Director, Resigns Over Tobacco and Other 
Investments, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/health/cdc-
brenda-fitzgerald-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/RVP3-RGYL].
368. Id.
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dent corruption or concealment, and the official lost her job as a 
result of the activity, little purpose would be served by additional 
legal proceedings.
The current system is arguably the worst of all worlds: substantial 
government resources, and the time of all affected government 
employees and would-be employees, are devoted to technical com-
pliance, while actual disciplinary measures are rare and direct en-
forcement of the various supposedly important criminal statutes is 
even rarer. At the same time, the public’s perception—correct or 
not—that government officials are not playing by the rules has only 
increased. To mix a playground metaphor, a tilt in the compliance 
and enforcement seesaw more toward the latter’s seat could para-
doxically help the public believe—correctly—that the playing field 
is a level one.
